Other-Regarding Preferences and Consequentialism by Borah, Abhinash
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Spring 5-17-2010
Other-Regarding Preferences and
Consequentialism
Abhinash Borah
University of Pennsylvania, abhinash@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Economic Theory Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/132
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Borah, Abhinash, "Other-Regarding Preferences and Consequentialism" (2010). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 132.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/132
Other-Regarding Preferences and Consequentialism
Abstract
This dissertation addresses a basic difficulty in accommodating other-regarding preferences within existing
models of decision making. Decision makers with such preferences may violate the property of stochastic
dominance that is shared by both expected utility and almost any model of non-expected utility. At its core,
stochastic dominance requires a decision maker's behavior to conform to a basic form of consequentialism,
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outcomes. On the other hand, decision makers with other-regarding preferences may show a concern for
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outcome-generating process. We provide theoretical foundations for a new representation of other-regarding
preferences that accommodates concerns for procedure and possible violations of stochastic dominance. Our
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procedure by expressing `payoffs' as a weighted average of her concerns for outcomes, and her concerns for
procedure. The weight used in evaluating this weighted average, which we call the procedural weight, is
uniquely determined and quantifies the relative importance of procedural concerns. In the special case in
which procedural concerns are absent our baseline decision model reduces to expected utility, and our most
parsimonious representation is one parameter richer than that model. We use our decision model to provide
an expressive theory of voting.
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ABSTRACT
OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES AND CONSEQUENTIALISM
Abhinash Borah
Andrew Postlewaite
This dissertation addresses a basic diﬃculty in accommodating other-regarding pref-
erences within existing models of decision making. Decision makers with such pref-
erences may violate the property of stochastic dominance that is shared by both
expected utility and almost any model of non-expected utility. At its core, stochastic
dominance requires a decision maker’s behavior to conform to a basic form of con-
sequentialism, namely, that her ranking of outcomes should be independent of the
stochastic process that generates these outcomes. On the other hand, decision mak-
ers with other-regarding preferences may show a concern for procedures ; that is they
may care not just about what the outcomes of others are but also about how these
outcomes are generated and therefore their ranking of outcomes may be intrinsically
dependent on the outcome-generating process. We provide theoretical foundations
for a new representation of other-regarding preferences that accommodates concerns
for procedure and possible violations of stochastic dominance. Our axioms provide a
sharp characterization of how a decision maker’s ranking of outcomes depends on the
procedure by expressing ‘payoﬀs’ as a weighted average of her concerns for outcomes,
and her concerns for procedure. The weight used in evaluating this weighted aver-
age, which we call the procedural weight, is uniquely determined and quantiﬁes the
relative importance of procedural concerns. In the special case in which procedural
concerns are absent our baseline decision model reduces to expected utility, and our
most parsimonious representation is one parameter richer than that model. We use
our decision model to provide an expressive theory of voting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Who we are, our persona, is shaped by both the private and social consequences of our
choices. In contrast, Decision Theory has been mainly concerned with the private side
of economic choices.”
– Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Aldo Rustichini (2008)
1.1 Motivation
The question of how an individual’s behavior is inﬂuenced by those around her (the
others in her world) has long concerned philosophers and psychologists. In recent
years, this is a question that has engaged many economists as well, and the term
other-regarding preferences has found an entry into their lexicon. A decision maker
has other-regarding preferences if her choices are inﬂuenced by a concern not just
about her own outcomes but others’ outcomes as well. Economists have collected
an impressive body of experimental evidence that suggests very strongly that such
concerns matter for many decision makers. At the same time they have shown that
introducing such concerns into economic models produce novel insights that are of
qualitative and quantitative signiﬁcance. For instance, economists have appealed to
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other-regarding preferences to deepen their understanding of such matters as Ricar-
dian equivalence (Andreoni, 1989), the equity premium puzzle (Abel, 1990), the dif-
ference in redistribution policy between United States and Western Europe (Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005), amongst others.
This dissertation provides new decision theoretic foundations for other-regarding
preferences. In this section we clarify why this exercise is necessary. In particular, we
argue that other-regarding preferences violates the property of ‘consequentialism’ in a
form that is considered almost unchallengeable and paradigmatic in existing theories.
We begin with two examples drawn from recent works in experimental economics,
which illustrate the challenge in modeling other-regarding preferences.
Example 1: Probabilistic Dictator Game
Consider a decision maker who has to choose between allocating 20 euros either to
herself or to some other person. Faced with this decision problem most decision mak-
ers, even altruistic ones, would perhaps prefer to keep the money. Let us assume that
this is the case. 1 Now consider introducing risk in the environment. In particular,
the decision maker is given the option of assigning some probability 휆 to the other
person getting the 20 euros, while assigning the complimentary probability of 1−휆 to
herself getting the money. Will the decision maker choose 휆 equal to 0, or will she
choose a positive value of 휆? Recent experiments conducted by Krawczyk and Le Lec
(2008) provide us with an answer to the question. They report that faced with such a
choice problem, a non-trivial number of their subjects (about 30%) choose to assign
some probability to the other person getting the 20 euros. On average, these subjects
were willing to give a probability of about 0.09 to the other person getting the money.
1The argument that we make below does not depend on this assumption.
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Example 2: Experimental Election
In a recent paper, Feddersen, Gailmard and Sandroni (2009) conduct an experimen-
tal election with two alternatives – call these 1 and 2. The experiment was run as
follows. First, subjects were broken up into two groups, one consisting of voters and
the other of non-voters. Then the voters cast their votes for 1 or 2. Finally, after all
voters had cast their vote, one voter was randomly picked, whose choice became the
group choice. The number of eligible voters was determined by the experimenters and
was varied across diﬀerent trials of the experiment. Accordingly, the probability of
a voter being pivotal (the reciprocal of the number of voters) was directly controlled
as a treatment variable in these experiment. As far as payoﬀs went, alternative 2
gave a higher monetary reward to the voters than alternative 1. On the other hand
alternative 1 was better for the non-voters than alternative 2. An interesting pattern
of choice that was exhibited by a non-trivial number of voters is the following. When
the probability of their vote being pivotal was high, in particular when it was 1, these
voters chose alternative 2. On the other hand when the pivot probability was low,
they instead voted for alternative 1.
This evidence is puzzling from the perspective of models of decision making under
risk (for instance, expected utility, rank dependent utility, ‘betweenness’ based theo-
ries, weighted utility theory, generalized expected utility, cumulative prospect theory).
In Example 1 these models would dictate that the decision maker should choose 휆
to be equal to 0, and in Example 2 they require that a voter’s choice should never
switch from alternative 2 to 1 when the probability that her vote is pivotal becomes
small. This disconnect arises because the decision makers in the experiments violate
consequentialism in a form that these theories cannot accommodate. This violation
can be explained as follows. Suppose, there are two outcomes 푥 and 푦, and a deci-
sion maker reveals that she prefers the outcome 푥 to the outcome 푦. Now consider
3
two lotteries. The ﬁrst one results in 푥 with some positive probability 휆 and some
other consequence 푝 (which is either an outcome or a lottery) with complimentary
probability 1 − 휆, the second gives 푦 with probability 휆 and 푝 with complimentary
probability 1 − 휆. Which of the two lotteries should any ‘rational’ decision maker,
who prefers the outcome 푥 to the outcome 푦, choose? It stands to reason that the
ﬁrst lottery is the obvious choice as it gives the decision maker a better chance of
getting her more preferred outcome. In fact, some may consider such a choice to
be synonymous with rationality, as choosing otherwise would imply behavior incon-
sistent with one’s goals. The above line of reasoning appears hardly controversial;
however, it does appeal to a critical assumption, namely, that the decision maker’s
ranking over outcomes is independent of the (stochastic) process that generates these
outcomes. This is the consequentialist assumption that the above mentioned theories
maintain but the experimental decision makers violate. Formally, this assumption is
referred to as stochastic dominance, and is deﬁned as follows. Assume that 푋 is a
set of outcomes, Δ(푋) is the set of lotteries (probability measures) on 푋, and ≻ is
the decision maker’s strict preference relation over lotteries in Δ(푋).
Deﬁnition 1.1. Suppose 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋 and 푝 ∈ Δ(푋). Then the decision maker’s pref-
erences satisfy stochastic dominance if for any 휆 ∈ (0, 1],
푥 ≻ 푦 ⇒ 휆푥 + (1− 휆)푝 ≻ 휆푦 + (1− 휆)푝,
where 휆푥 + (1−휆)푝 (resp. 휆푦 + (1−휆)푝) is the compound lottery that gives 푥 (resp.
푦) with probability 휆 and 푝 with probability 1− 휆.
The diﬀerence between the two lotteries 휆푥 + (1− 휆)푝 and 휆푦 + (1− 휆)푝 is only
in the 휆-probability event. Under the former the outcome is 푥 and under the latter
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the outcome is 푦. Stochastic dominance requires that the ranking over these two
lotteries must be determined solely on the basis of how the outcomes 푥 and 푦 are
ranked. Accordingly, the choices of decision makers, who violate consequentialism in
this sense, cannot be explained based on a concern for outcomes alone, something else
other than outcomes matters. For decision makers with other-regarding preferences,
it then begs the question, what is this ‘something else’ that matters?
The hypothesis we pursue is the following: Decision makers with other-regarding
preferences may care not just about what others’ outcomes are, but also about how
others’ outcomes are determined. This can be thought of as a concern for the process
or procedure via which others’ outcomes are determined. Such decision makers may
value the choice of a lottery not only instrumentally in terms of the outcomes it may
lead to, but also non-instrumentally as it may be associated with certain procedures
for determining outcomes thats is considered desirable. For instance, an altruistic
decision maker in the probabilistic dictator game may care not just about the ex-post
payoﬀs of the other person, but also about ex-ante chance that the other person had
of getting the money. Alternatively put, she may feel very diﬀerently about the ex-
post allocation in which she gets the 20 euros depending on whether the other person
had some chance of getting the money or none at all.
There has been a great deal of interest in the last two decades or so in incorporat-
ing other-regarding concerns like fairness, equity and envy in economic models. The
discussion above contains an important insight for this research program. It demon-
strates that models of other-regarding preferences that focus exclusively on outcomes
may not adequately capture all the concerns of decision makers with such prefer-
ences. A leading example of such models would be ‘social utility models’ like those of
Bolton (1991), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness
and Rabin (2002). In these models, a decision maker’s utility is deﬁned over her own
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outcomes and those of others.2 Such models are unable to accommodate procedu-
ral concerns of decision makers. Therefore, a satisfactory analysis of other-regarding
preferences requires a decision model that incorporates procedural concerns, and the
manner in which concerns for outcomes and procedures interact. This dissertation
introduces such a decision model.
We propose a tractable and parsimonious utility representation that clariﬁes the
interaction between concerns for outcomes and procedures. In addition, we identify
a set of axioms on behavior that are equivalent to the proposed representation. We
provide these axioms with two goals in mind. First, they are meant to provide a
choice theoretic foundation of our decision model. The key idea of our axioms is that
once concerns for procedure are accounted for, choice behavior adheres to the spirit
of the ‘classical axioms’ of decision theory. Therefore, they are meant to suggest
the plausibility of our decision model. Second, our axioms are meant to provide the
grounds on which our decision model may be falsiﬁed. Just as we used our motivating
example to show a violation of stochastic dominance and argue that standard models
of decision making may not be adequate in modeling other-regarding preferences, so
too, choice behavior that violates our axioms would falsify our decision model. We
now provide a brief sketch of our representation.
2For instance, Fehr and Schmidt propose the following social utility function to evaluate the
utility derived by individual 1 in a two individual world. Suppose individual 1 receives the outcome
푥1 and individual 2 receives the outcome 푥2 (푥1, 푥2 ∈ ℝ+). Then individual 1’s utility is given by:
푈1(푥1, 푥2) = 푥1 - 휇.max{푥2 − 푥1, 0} - 휇′.max{푥1 − 푥2, 0}, 휇, 휇′ > 0.
The basic idea behind this functional form is to incorporate a notion of inequity aversion. The
decision maker receives ‘utility’ from her own outcome 푥1, but receives ‘dis-utility’ from inequities
in the ﬁnal allocation.
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1.2 The Baseline Representation and Its Interpre-
tation
Assume that there are 푛 individuals, denoted 1, . . . , 푛, about whose outcomes our
decision maker (DM hereafter) may care. Denote the set of DM’s outcomes by the
set 푍, individual 푖’s outcomes by the set 푍푖, 푖 = 1, . . . , 푛, and let 퐴 =
∏푛
푖=1 푍푖. Let
푝 be a simple lottery on the allocation space 푍 × 퐴, and let 푝퐴 denote the marginal
probability measures of 푝 over 퐴. Under our baseline decision model, DM evaluates
the lottery 푝 by the function:
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎){(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)},
where 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1], for all 푧 ∈ 푍, and 푝(푧, 푎) denotes the probability that the lottery 푝
assigns to the outcome (푧, 푎).
The representation provides a tractable and parsimonious account of the inter-
action between concerns for outcome and concerns for procedure in determining the
decision maker’s choices over lotteries. Note that, under the representation, DM
considers the marginal probability measure 푝퐴 over 퐴 to be the procedure by which
others’ outcomes are determined under the lottery 푝. Consider any outcome (푧, 푎) in
the support of 푝; DM’s evaluation of this outcome is conditioned on the procedure
푝퐴. The term inside the parentheses,
(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)
reﬂects her payoﬀs from the outcome (푧, 푎) when the procedure determining others’
outcomes is 푝퐴. This payoﬀ is a weighted average of two terms. The ﬁrst term
is DM’s payoﬀs from the outcome (푧, 푎), whereas the second term is DM’s payoﬀs
from the procedure 푝퐴 given that she receives outcome 푧. The same function 푤 is
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used to evaluate DM’s concern for outcomes as well as procedures.3 The weight 휎푧
used in evaluating this weighted average is subjective; that is, we derive this weight
from DM’s choice behavior. We refer to 휎푧 as a procedural weight, and it quantiﬁes
the relative strength of concerns for procedure relative to concerns for outcome in
determining DM’s choices. Observe that the procedural weight is allowed to depend
on DM’s outcomes.4 Finally, once we have evaluated these payoﬀs for all the outcomes
(푧′, 푎′) that are possible under 푝, we simply use an ‘expected utility criterion’ over
these payoﬀs to evaluate DM’s overall payoﬀ from the lottery 푝.
There are three key ideas embedded in our representation. First, the represen-
tation speciﬁes that a decision maker’s evaluation of an outcome (푧, 푎) depends on
the procedure by which others’ outcomes are determined. In particular, when an
outcome (푧, 푎) is realized under some lottery 푝, we may think of the triple (푧, 푎, 푝퐴)
as representing the ‘things DM cares about’ in this situation. We call such a triple
a procedure-contingent outcome. We use information about DM’s ranking of
lotteries on the allocation space 푍×퐴, which is a primitive of our model, to elicit her
ranking over procedure-contingent outcomes. Second, the representation provides a
simple expression for how these procedure-contingent outcomes are evaluated. It says
that the concern for outcomes and procedures interact linearly. The strength of the
procedural concern is captured by the parameters 휎푧, which, as we mentioned above,
are subjective. In particular, decision makers for whom the parameters 휎푧 are all 0
are expected utility maximizers. In the special case in which the 휎푧’s are all equal, our
3The domain of the function 푤 is 푍 × Δ퐴, where Δ퐴 refers to the set of simple lotteries on the
set 퐴. We abuse notation by not distinguishing between the outcome 푎 and the degenerate lottery
that gives 푎 with probability 1.
4We do axiomatize a special case of our baseline representation in which the procedural weights
are independent of DM’s outcomes. In this case DM evaluates the lottery 푝 by the function:
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎){(1− 휎)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푤(푧, 푝퐴)},
where 휎 ∈ [0, 1].
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model is parsimonious in the sense of being one parameter richer than expected utility.
Third, in our representation, once DM’s concerns for procedure have been accounted
for by expanding the notion of outcomes to that of procedure-contingent outcomes,
‘event-separability’ holds over this expanded space of outcomes. This property helps
to keep the representation tractable. We consider two other extensions of our baseline
model. First, we allow for ‘nonlinear probability weighting’ in DM’s evaluation of risk
faced by others. Second, we present a representation in which DM’s evaluation of an
allocation is separable across her outcome and others’ outcomes.
We conclude this discussion of our representation with a word on our axioms. Be-
yond the usual axioms of weak order and continuity, four other axioms characterize
our baseline representation. First, we have an axiom in the spirit of the weak axiom of
revealed preference that allows us to consistently deduce from DM’s choices over lot-
teries her ranking of procedure-contingent outcomes. Second, we have a monotonicity
axiom, which says that if in some event DM considers the outcome and procedure
under one lottery better than that under another lottery, and ‘everything else is
constant,’ then the ﬁrst lottery is ranked higher than the second. Third, although
independence in the usual sense ‘fails’ in our set-up, we are still able to recover a ‘sub-
jective version’ of this axiom. Finally, we have a dominance axiom which requires
that once DM’s concerns for procedure have been accounted for, an appropriately
deﬁned property of event-wise dominance holds.
1.3 Connections to the Literature
This project relates to the decision theoretic literature on nonseparable models of
preferences in environments of risk. In such models decision makers’ preferences are
nonseparable across mutually exclusive events in the sense that their evaluation of a
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prospect in a given event may be intrinsically tied to considerations relating to other
events that could have occurred but did not. In the words of Machina (1989), “An
agent with nonseparable preferences feels (both ex ante and ex post) that risk which
is borne but not realized is gone in the sense of having been consumed (or “borne”),
rather than gone in the sense of irrelevant.”5 These are decision makers who violate
the independence axiom of expected utility theory. It is worth highlighting here that
Hammond (1988) shows that the condition of independence/event-separability can be
derived using consequentialist foundations. Informally speaking, a decision maker’s
preferences satisﬁes the independence condition if and only if a decision maker’s choice
behavior at ‘any point’ in a decision problem is a function only of the lotteries that
are feasible at that point.6 It is worth noting that consequentialism in the sense of
stochastic dominance that was mentioned above is a strictly weaker notion than the
one in Hammond.
There is a large decision theoretic literature that accommodates preferences that
are nonseparable and hence violate the independence axiom. Prominent examples
include rank dependent utility, betweenness based theories (like implicit expected
utility), and generalized prospect theory.7 The key feature of these models is that
although event-separability of preferences is not required to hold on the space of all
lotteries, each of these models identiﬁes a subset of lotteries over which preferences are
separable (see Chew and Epstein (1988) for an illustration of this point). Decision
5The emphases in the quote are as in the original.
6More formally, let 푋 be a set of outcomes and Δ(푋) the space of lotteries deﬁned on 푋. Let Ξ
be ‘a rich class of decision problems.’ Let 퐹 : Ξ ⇉ Δ(푋) denote a feasibility correspondence that
speciﬁes the feasible set of lotteries that can possibly result from the decision maker’s choices in
any decision problem. Let 퐵 : Ξ ⇉ Δ(푋) be a behavior correspondence that speciﬁes the decision
maker’s choice behavior in any decision problem. The decision maker is a consequentialist if there
exists a choice correspondence 퐶 : 2Δ(푋) ∖ ∅ ⇉ Δ(푋) such that for all 휉 ∈ Ξ, 퐵(휉) = 퐶(퐹 (휉)). In
other words, changes in the structure of a decision problem should have no bearing on choices unless
they change the feasible set. It is critical to recognize that we provide this deﬁnition for a given set
of outcomes that we hold ﬁxed.
7Refer to Starmer (2000) for a comprehensive survey of non-expected utility models.
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makers whose preferences are accommodated by any of these models may then be
thought to conform with consequentialism in a restricted sense. In particular, under
all these models behavior retains consequentialism in the minimal sense of stochastic
dominance. In contrast, the decision model we present here does not require behavior
to conform to this minimal notion of consequentialism. The important point to
recognize is that consequentialism (deﬁned with respect to a given set of outcomes)
and a concern for procedures are fundamentally conﬂicting notions, and therefore,
consequentialism has to be given up at a very basic level to accommodate concerns
for procedure. We should point out here that Karni and Safra (2002) is another paper
that accommodates violations of consequentialism in the minimal sense of stochastic
dominance.
Our work also relates to a literature on procedures. This line of research seeks
to highlight the fact that in addition to outcomes or consequences, the way deci-
sions are made may itself inﬂuence an individual’s well being. Sen (1997) explains it
thus: “Maximizing behavior diﬀers from nonvolitional maximization because of the
fundamental relevance of the choice act, which has to be placed in a central position
in analyzing maximizing behavior. A person’s preferences over comprehensive out-
comes (including the choice process) have to be distinguished from the conditional
preferences over culmination outcomes given the acts of choice.”8 In order to model
such concerns for procedure, Sen suggests using “menu dependent” models of choice
behavior, which allow a decision maker’s preferences over outcomes to depend on the
set (menu) from which the choice is made. The vast majority of work that highlights
concerns for procedure have been conducted within an empirical/experimental set-
ting. Some examples are Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), Bies, Tripp and
Neale (1993), Frey and Pommerehne (1993), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005)
8The emphases in the quote are as in the original.
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and Krawczyk and Le Lec (2008).
Finally, our work is part of a large literature on other-regarding preferences. A
vast portion of this research has been undertaken within experimental settings, and
this work has played an important role in demonstrating that other-regarding con-
cerns matter to many decision makers. This experimental literature is too vast to
adequately document here. For a recent survey of this literature, the reader may
refer to Cooper and Kagel (2009). Inspired by this evidence from the ‘lab,’ many
researchers have sought to incorporate other-regarding concerns into economic mod-
els. ‘Social utility’ models are a leading example of this endeavor. In these models a
decision maker’s utility is deﬁned over not just her own outcomes but others outcomes
as well. Diﬀerent forms of other-regarding concerns like fairness, envy, altruism, etc.
are incorporated into these models by writing functional forms for utility that intu-
itively correspond to the particular ‘emotion’ that is sought to be modeled. Some
leading examples of such models are Bolton (1991), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002). The diﬀerence between these
works and ours is twofold. First, these models are outcome based and do not consider
concerns for procedure. Second, these models are not based on an axiomatic treat-
ment of choice behavior. This is an observation that holds true in general about how
other-regarding preferences have been treated in the literature. Despite the interest
in such preferences, there are not that many papers studying the choice theoretic
foundations of such preferences. Some notable exceptions include Ok and Kocke-
sen (2000), Gilboa and Schmeidler (2002), Karni and Safra (2002), Neilson (2006),
Sandbu (2005), Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2008) and Rohde (2009).
We conclude this chapter by citing an important debate that was initiated by
an inﬂuential paper by Harsanyi (1955). In this paper Harsanyi postulated that an
individual’s social or moral preference that represents her moral value judgments
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about allocations in society satisﬁes the independence axiom of expected utility the-
ory. The question of whether this is a reasonable axiom for social or moral preferences
yielded a spirited debate involving many distinguished participants, including, Strotz
(1958, 1961), Diamond (1967), Keeney (1980), Broome (1982, 1984), Sen (1985) and
Harsanyi (1975, 1978) himself. One of the most articulate and well-known critiques of
Harsanyi’s viewpoint has been presented by Machina (1989), whose counter-example
has come to be known as Machina’s Mom in the literature. The example goes as
follows. A mom has an indivisible treat that she could give either to her son or her
daughter. She is indiﬀerent between the daughter getting the treat or the son getting
the treat, but in a violation of the independence axiom, she strictly prefers a coin ﬂip
over each of the sure outcomes.
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Chapter 2
The Basic Representations
2.1 The Framework
2.1.1 Preliminaries
We assume that our stylized society comprises of a decision maker (DM) and 푛 other
individuals, denoted 1, . . . , 푛, and associated with each individual is a well deﬁned
set of outcomes.1 We denote the set of DM’s outcomes by 푍 and those of individual 푖
by 푍푖, 푖 = 1, . . . , 푛. Further, we let 퐴 =
∏푛
푖=1 퐴푖 denote the set of outcome-vectors
for the others (others’ outcomes, for short). We will assume that each of the sets 푍,
푍푖, 푖 = 1, . . . , 푛, are connected topological sets.
We denote the set of simple probability measures (simple lotteries, or just lotteries,
for short) on the sets 푍 × 퐴, 푍 and 퐴 by Δ, Δ푍 and Δ퐴 respectively. We will denote
elements of Δ by 푝, 푞 etc., those of Δ푍 by 푝푍 , 푞푍 etc., and those of Δ퐴 by 푝퐴, 푞퐴
etc. We deﬁne a convex combination of lotteries in any of these sets in the standard
way.2 For any 푝 in Δ we denote by 푝푍 ∈ Δ푍 , the marginal probability measure of 푝
1To ﬁx ideas the reader may think of these outcomes as money or some consumption good.
2For instance, if 푝1, . . . , 푝퐾 ∈ Δ, and 휆1, . . . , 휆퐾 are constants in [0, 1] that sum to 1,
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over 푍 and by 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, the marginal probability measure of 푝 over 퐴;3 further, we
denote by 푝퐴,푧 ∈ Δ퐴, the conditional probability measure of 푝 over 퐴 with respect to
the event that DM gets 푧 ∈ 푍.
We want to highlight two special classes of lotteries in Δ. The ﬁrst consists of
those 푝 ∈ Δ in which DM gets some outcome 푧 ∈ 푍 for sure, i.e., 푝푍(푧) = 1 for some
푧 ∈ 푍. We will abuse notation and denote such a lottery by 푝 = (푧,푝퐴). The second
consists of those 푝 ∈ Δ in which the others get some outcome-vector 푎 ∈ 퐴 for sure,
i.e., 푝퐴(푎) = 1 for some 푎 ∈ 퐴. We will denote such a lottery (again with an abuse
of notation) by 푝 = (푝푍 ,푎). Following standard notation, we shall at times denote
lotteries by explicitly listing the elements in the support along with their respective
probabilities. For instance,
푝 = [(푧1, 푎1), 휆1; . . . ; (푧퐾 , 푎퐾), 휆퐾 ]
shall denote a lottery in Δ that gives the outcome (푧푘, 푎푘) with probability 휆푘, 푘 =
1, . . . , 퐾. A more compact notation for this, which will be used at times, is the
following:
푝 = [< (푧푘, 푎푘), 휆푘 >(푧푘,푎푘)∈푆[푝]], where 푆[푝] stands for the support of 푝.
Finally, note that we will abuse notation throughout by not distinguishing between
an outcome and a lottery that gives that outcome with probability 1. For instance,
(푧, 푎) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 shall stand both for an outcome as well as the lottery that gives this
outcome with probability 1.
then
∑퐾
푘=1 휆
푘푝푘 denotes an element in Δ that gives the outcome (푧, 푎) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 with probability∑퐾
푘=1 휆
푘푝푘(푧, 푎).
3When we reference lotteries like 푝푍 ∈ Δ푍 and 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, it will be clear from the context whether
we refer to them in the sense of marginal measures of a lottery 푝 ∈ Δ, or ‘simply’ as elements of Δ푍
and Δ퐴.
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2.1.2 Preference
DM’s preferences are given by a weak order (a binary relation that is complete and
transitive) ≽ on the set Δ. The symmetric and asymmetric components of ≽ are
deﬁned in the usual way and denoted by ∼ and ≻ respectively. For any 푧 ∈ 푍, we
use the primitive preference relation ≽ to deﬁne a weak order ≽푧 on Δ퐴 as follows:
for any 푝퐴, 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴,
푝퐴 ≽푧 푞퐴 if (푧, 푝퐴) ≽ (푧, 푞퐴).
The symmetric and asymmetric components of ≽푧 are deﬁned in the usual way and
denoted by ∼푧 and ≻푧 respectively. We will assume that the indiﬀerence surfaces of
≽푧 restricted to 퐴 are connected. That is, for any ≽푧, and for any 푎 ∈ 퐴, {푎′ ∈ 퐴 :
푎′ ∼푧 푎} is a connected subset of 퐴. The family of preference relations (≽푧)푧∈푍 is the
basic building block of our decision model. The interpretation that we have in mind
is that this family represents the values of the decision maker because any preference
relation ≽푧 in this family tells us about DM’s preferences over the risk faced by others
when she is assured some outcome 푧 ∈ 푍. We will assume that the values of DM
are contingent on what her own circumstances are; that is, her preferences over the
risk faced by others varies depending on what outcome she herself gets. Formally, we
have the following condition.
Contingent Values: If ≽푧 such that ≻푧 ∕= ∅, then there exists ≽푧′ ∕= ≽푧, with ≻푧′
∕= ∅, such that the following holds: for all 푎˜ ∈ 퐴, there exists 푎, 푎′, 푎′′ ∈ 퐴, with 푎˜
∼푧 푎, and
푎′ ∼푧′ 푎 ∼푧′ 푎′′, 푎′ ≽푧 푎 ≽푧 푎′′.
Further, if 푎 is not a maximal (resp. minimal) element of ≽푧, then 푎′ ≻푧 푎 (resp. 푎
≻푧 푎′′).
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2.2 Axioms and Representations
2.2.1 Axioms for Baseline Representation
This section presents axioms on choice behavior that are necessary and suﬃcient for
representing ≽ by a utility function 푊 : Δ → ℝ of the form
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎){(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)},
where 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1], for all 푧 ∈ 푍, and 푝(푧, 푎) denotes the probability that 푝 assigns to
the outcome (푧, 푎) ∈ 푍 × 퐴.
Basic Axioms
We require that DM’s preferences are complete and transitive.
AXIOM: Weak Order
≽ is complete and transitive.
Our next axiom speciﬁes continuity properties of DM’s preferences. To state it, we
ﬁrst observe that the topology on the sets 푍 and 푍푖, 푖 = 1, . . . ,푛, induces the
product topology on the set [푍 × 퐴] × [푍 × 퐴].
AXIOM: Bounded Bi-Continuity
Bi-Continuity: For any 휆 ∈ [0, 1] and 푞 ∈ Δ, the sets
{((푧′, 푎′), (푧′′, 푎′′)) : [(푧′, 푎′), 휆; (푧′′, 푎′′), 1− 휆] ≽ 푞},
and,
{((푧′, 푎′), (푧′′, 푎′′)) : 푞 ≽ [(푧′, 푎′), 휆; (푧′′, 푎′′), 1− 휆]}
are closed in [푍 × 퐴] × [푍 × 퐴].
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Boundedness: There exists 푎∗ ∈ 퐴, such that for all 푝 ∈ Δ there exists 푧, 푧 ∈ 푍
satisfying
(푧, 푎∗) ≽ 푝 ≽ (푧, 푎∗).
An important implication of bi-continuity is that for any 푧 ∈ 푍, the preference
relation ≽푧 satisﬁes the following continuity property. For any 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, the sets,
{푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ≽푧 푝퐴} and {푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푝퐴 ≽푧 푎}
are closed in 퐴. This continuity property in conjunction with the condition that
≽푧 satisﬁes stochastic dominance (which will be implied by our axioms) and the
topological assumption on 퐴 implies that every 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 has a certainty equivalent
in 퐴 with respect to the preference relation ≽푧; that is, for any 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, there exists
풞ℰ푧(푝퐴) ∈ 퐴 such that 푝퐴 ∼푧 풞ℰ푧(푝퐴).
Eliciting Preferences over Procedure-Contingent Outcomes
As discussed in the introduction, decision makers that we accommodate in our model
may care both about the outcomes of others as well as the procedure by which their
outcomes are determined. For any lottery 푝 ∈ Δ, we shall consider the marginal
probability measure 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 over others’ outcomes as the procedure determining
their outcomes. The decision maker’s evaluation of an ex-post outcome (푧, 푎) ∈ 푍×퐴
may be contingent on the procedure. In other words, for any outcome (푧, 푎) that is in
the support of two lotteries 푝, 푝′ ∈Δ, the ex-post evaluation of this outcome may diﬀer
depending on the respective procedures 푝퐴 and 푝
′
퐴. We deﬁne the following notion to
account for this diﬀerence: For any 푝 ∈ Δ and (푧, 푎) in the support of 푝, we will refer
to the triple (푧, 푎, 푝퐴) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 × Δ퐴 as a procedure-contingent outcome. Our
representation implies that DM has a ranking over procedure-contingent outcomes.
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We will propose here a method of eliciting this ranking from DM’s choice behavior
over lotteries in Δ. To that end, we will provide a deﬁnition of what it means for
DM to consider one procedure-contingent outcome to be better than another. The
key idea behind this deﬁnition will be that in assessing any procedure-contingent
outcome, say, (푧, 푎, 푝퐴), the decision maker shall independently evaluate the outcome
that others get, 푎, and the procedure by which their outcomes are determined, 푝퐴,
using the preference relation ≽푧. We introduce the following piece of notation that
shall be useful in the exposition of the deﬁnition.
∙ Let (푧, 푎), (푧, 푎′) be respectively in the support of 푝, 푝′ ∈ Δ. Then (푧, 푎, 푝퐴) =∗
(푧, 푎′, 푝′퐴) if 푎 ∼푧 푎′ and 푝퐴 ∼푧 푝′퐴.
Consider ﬁrst the following intermediary deﬁnition that deﬁnes a binary relation on
Δ.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Two lotteries,
푝 = [(푧1, 푎1), 휆1; . . . ; (푧퐾 , 푎퐾), 휆퐾 ] and 푝˜ = [(푧1, 푎˜1), 휆1; . . . ; (푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 휆퐾 ]
in Δ are comparable at 푧푗 if for all 푘 ∕= 푗 (푗, 푘 ∈ {1, . . . ,퐾}), we have (푧푘, 푎푘, 푝퐴)
=∗ (푧푘, 푎˜푘, 푝˜퐴).
Observe that in each of the 휆푘-events, 푘 ∕= 푗, the outcome that others get under 푝
(푎푘), belongs to the same indiﬀerence class of ≽푧푘 as the outcome that they get under
푝˜ (푎˜푘). Further, the procedure that determines others’ outcome under 푝 (푝퐴), belongs
to the same indiﬀerence class of ≽푧푘 as the procedure that determines their outcome
under 푝˜ (푝˜퐴). Accordingly, in each of these 휆푘-events (푘 ∕= 푗), if DM independently
evaluates the outcome that others get and the procedure that determines this out-
come using the preference relation ≽푧푘 , then, from a preference perspective, we may
conclude that DM considers the lotteries 푝 and 푝˜ to be identical in these events; or
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equivalently, that DM considers the procedure contingent outcomes (푧푘, 푎푘, 푝퐴) and
(푧푘, 푎˜푘, 푝˜퐴) to be identical. Alternatively, the only place where DM may consider 푝
and 푝˜ to diﬀer is in her assessment of the procedure-contingent outcomes (푧푗, 푎푗, 푝퐴)
and (푧푗, 푎˜푗, 푝˜퐴). We may then draw a direct inference about how DM ranks the
procedure-contingent outcomes (푧푗, 푎푗, 푝퐴) and (푧푗, 푎˜푗, 푝˜퐴) from how she ranks 푝 and
푝˜. For instance, if 푝 ≽ 푝˜, then we may draw the inference that DM considers the
procedure-contingent outcome (푧푗, 푎푗, 푝퐴) to be better than (푧푗, 푎˜푗, 푝˜퐴). We may ex-
tend this method of elicitation by putting together a ‘chain’ of such inferences. To
do so, we introduce the following notation. For any
푝 = [(푧1, 푎1), 휆1; . . . ; (푧퐾 , 푎퐾), 휆퐾 ] and 푞 = [(푧1, 푎˜1), 휆1; . . . ; (푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 휆퐾 ]
in Δ that are comparable at some 푧푗, we will denote the corresponding outcome-
vector that others’ get under 푝 and 푞, when DM gets this 푧푗, by 푎(푧푗, 푝) and 푎(푧푗, 푞)
respectively. That is 푎(푧푗, 푝) shall refer to the outcome-vector 푎푗 and 푎(푧푗, 푞) shall
refer to 푎˜푗.
Consider lotteries 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ that are comparable at some 푧 ∈ 푍. If DM, say,
prefers 푝 over 푞, then, based on the above argument, we may draw the inference
that DM considers the procedure-contingent outcome (푧,푎(푧, 푝),푝퐴) to be better than
the procedure-contingent outcome (푧,푎(푧, 푞),푞퐴). Similarly, if there exists 푝
′, 푞′ ∈ Δ
that are comparable at 푧 and 푝′ ≽ 푞′, then we may similarly draw the inference that
DM considers (푧,푎(푧, 푝′),푝′퐴) to be better than (푧,푎(푧, 푞
′),푞′퐴). If in addition, it is also
the case that (푧,푎(푧, 푞),푞퐴) =
∗ (푧,푎(푧, 푝′),푝′퐴), then we may connect the two infer-
ences by appealing to the fact that from a preference perspective (푧,푎(푧, 푞),푞퐴) and
(푧,푎(푧, 푝′),푝′퐴) are considered identical by DM (under the interpretation, suggested
above, that she independently evaluates the outcome of others and the procedure
generating this outcome using the preference relation ≽푧). It then seems natural to
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suggest on grounds of consistency that DM considers the procedure-contingent out-
come (푧,푎(푧, 푝),푝퐴) to be better than the procedure-contingent outcome (푧,푎(푧, 푞
′),푞′퐴).
There is no reason why the ‘choice chain’ or ‘choice sequence’ has to stop at two. More
generally, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let (푧, 푎), (푧, 푎˜) be respectively in the support of 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ. The
procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎, 푝퐴) is revealed better (resp. revealed strictly
better) than the procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎˜, 푞퐴) if there exists a ﬁnite se-
quence (푝푘, 푞푘)퐾푘=1 ⊆ Δ × Δ satisfying,
(i) 푝 = 푝1, 푞 = 푞퐾,
(ii) 푝푘 and 푞푘 are comparable at 푧 ∈ 푍, for all 푘 = 1, . . . ,퐾, and
(iii) (푧, 푎(푧, 푞푘), 푞푘퐴) =
∗ (푧, 푎(푧, 푝푘+1), 푝푘+1퐴 ), for all 푘 = 1, . . . ,퐾 − 1,
such that 푝푘 ≽ 푞푘 for all 푘 = 1, . . . ,퐾 (resp., 푝푘 ≽ 푞푘 for all 푘 = 1, . . ,퐾, and
푝푘
′ ≻ 푞푘′ for some 푘′).
Further, (푧, 푎, 푝퐴) is revealed indiﬀerent to (푧, 푎˜, 푞퐴) if 푝
푘 ∼ 푞푘, for all 푘.
The following axiom, which is in the spirit of the weak axiom of revealed preference,
is a consistency axiom on DM’s behavior. It says that if a particular sequence of
choices reveals that one procedure-contingent outcome is better than another, then
it should not be the case that some other sequence of choices reveals a contradictory
implication.
AXIOM: Revealed Consistency
Let (푧, 푎), (푧, 푎˜) be respectively in the support of 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ. If (푧,푎,푝퐴) is revealed better
than (푧,푎˜,푞퐴), then there does not exist 푝˜, 푞˜ ∈ Δ, with (푧, 푎), (푧, 푎˜) in the support of
푝˜, 푞˜ respectively, and 푝˜퐴 = 푝퐴, 푞˜퐴 = 푞퐴, such that (푧,푎˜,푞˜퐴) is revealed strictly better
than (푧,푎,푝˜퐴).
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Our next axiom provides a monotonicity restriction on comparable lotteries. We
know that for any two such lotteries 푝 and 푝˜ that are, say, comparable at some 푧 ∈
푍, from a preference perspective, they diﬀer only in the event that DM gets outcome
푧. Now, if in this event, the outcome that others get under 푝 is preferred to the
outcome that others get under 푝˜ according to ≽푧, and furthermore, the procedure
푝퐴 is preferred to the procedure 푝˜퐴 according to ≽푧, then the axiom of comparable
monotonicity requires DM to prefer 푝 over 푝˜.
AXIOM: Comparable Monotonicity
Let 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ be comparable at some 푧 ∈ 푍. If 푎(푧, 푝) ≽푧 푎(푧, 푞) and 푝퐴 ≽푧 푞퐴, then
푝 ≽ 푞.
Subjective Mixtures and Separability
The independence axiom in the usual form is not appropriate for our setting. We
introduce here a ‘subjective version’ of this axiom by appealing to the notion of
subjective mixtures of lotteries. The idea is a simple one. Consider two lotteries 푝, 푞
∈ Δ with 푝 ≻ 푞. For any 휆 ∈ [0, 1], we want to identify an element 휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞 ∈
Δ that may be considered a 휆-weighted preference average of 푝 and 푞. Heuristically
speaking, suppose DM has a ‘preference scale’ in which 푝 is assigned the value 1 and
푞 the value 0. Then we want 휆푝 ⊕ (1 − 휆)푞 to be an element on that scale that is
assigned the value 휆. Of course, if ≽ were to satisfy the axioms of the von Neumann
and Morgenstern world, then 휆푝 ⊕ (1 − 휆)푞 will be any element in the indiﬀerence
class of 휆푝 + (1− 휆)푞. That is, subjective mixtures and objective mixtures coincide
in that set-up. We deﬁne here a notion of subjective mixtures for three classes of
lotteries.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Given 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ that are comparable at some 푧 ∈ 푍, we denote by
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휆푝 ⊕ (1−휆)푞 an element in Δ that is comparable with 푝 (and hence with 푞) at 푧 and
satisﬁes,
푎(푧, 휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞) ∼푧 휆푎(푧, 푝) + (1− 휆)푎(푧, 푞) and (휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞)퐴 ∼푧 휆푝퐴 +
(1− 휆)푞퐴.
Further, if 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ are such that either 푝 = (푝푍 , 푎), 푞 = (푞푍 , 푎) for some 푎 ∈ 퐴, or
푝 = (푧, 푝퐴), 푞 = (푧, 푞퐴) for some 푧 ∈ 푍, then we deﬁne,
휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞 = 휆푝 + (1− 휆)푞
We will say that 푝 and 푞 ∈ Δ are mixture comparable if 휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞 exists for
all 휆 ∈ [0, 1].
For lotteries 푝 and 푞 that are comparable at some 푧 ∈ 푍, the subjective mixture
휆푝 ⊕ (1 − 휆)푞 is a lottery that is comparable with 푝 and 푞 at 푧, and in the event
that DM gets 푧, the outcome that others get under this lottery is a 휆-weighted
preference average (according to ≽푧) of the outcomes that they get under 푝 and 푞,
and the procedure that determines others’ outcome under this lottery is a 휆-weighted
preference average (according to ≽푧) of the respective procedures under 푝 and 푞. An
important point to observe is that there may be multiple lotteries in Δ that may
satisfy the above conditions. If that is the case, then by conditional monotonicity all
these lotteries must be indiﬀerent. As stated in the deﬁnition, 휆푝 ⊕ (1−휆)푞 denotes a
representative of this indiﬀerence class. On the other hand, for lotteries of the type 푝
= (푝푍 , 푎), 푞 = (푞푍 , 푎), or, 푝 = (푧, 푝퐴), 푞 = (푧, 푞퐴), the deﬁnition of subjective mixtures
coincide with that of objective mixtures. The independence axiom we propose here
shall hold only for mixture comparable lotteries. Within this subclass it retains
the subjective interpretation of the classical independence axiom of expected utility
theory. In addition, it will imply that the preference relation ≽푧 satisﬁes the classical
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independence axiom of expected utility theory for any 푧 ∈ 푍.
AXIOM: Comparable Independence
Let 푝1, 푝2, 푞1, 푞2 in Δ be such that 푝1, 푝2 are mixture comparable, as are 푞1, 푞2. Then,
for all 휆 ∈ (0, 1],
[푝1 ≻ 푞1, 푝2 ∼ 푞2] ⇒ 휆푝1 ⊕ (1− 휆)푝2 ≻ 휆푞1 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞2.
Our ﬁnal axiom, which we call dominance, prescribes that once DM’s concerns
for procedure have been accounted for by expanding the notion of outcomes to that
of procedure-contingent outcomes, ‘event-separability’ on this expanded notion of
outcomes is normatively appealing. To present this axiom we require the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Let 푝 ∈ Δ be such that for each (푧푘, 푎푘) in the support of 푝, 푘 =
1, . . . ,퐾, the procedure-contingent outcome (푧푘,푎푘,푝퐴) is revealed indiﬀerent to a
procedure-contingent outcome (푧푘,푎˜푘, 푎˜푘) for some 푎˜푘 ∈ 퐴. Then we shall refer to the
lottery,
휋(푝) = [(푧1, 푎˜1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ
as the procedure-adjusted equivalent of 푝.
Following standard terminology, we will say that a lottery 푝 ∈Δ ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominates a lottery 푞 ∈ Δ with respect to ≽ if for all (푧, 푎) ∈ 푍 × 퐴, the
probability that 푝 assigns to outcomes that are at least as good as (푧, 푎) (according
to ≽) is at least as large as the corresponding probability under 푞, and is strictly
larger for some (푧, 푎) ∈ 푍 × 퐴.
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The axiom of dominance says the following.
AXIOM: Dominance
Let 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ and 휋(푝), 휋(푞) ∈ Δ be procedure-adjusted equivalents of 푝 and 푞 respec-
tively. If 휋(푝) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates 휋(푞) with respect to ≽, then 푝 ≻ 푞.
This axiom ﬁrst of all requires DM to consider a procedure-contingent outcome like
(푧, 푎˜, 푎˜), in which the outcome and procedure are the same, to be equivalent to the
outcome (푧, 푎˜). Accordingly, if a procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎, 푝퐴) is revealed
indiﬀerent to a procedure-contingent outcome like (푧, 푎˜, 푎˜), then this axiom prescribes
that it be evaluated the same as (푧, 푎˜). Further, if all the procedure-contingent out-
comes that are generated by a lottery can be ‘equated’ to outcomes via such revealed
indiﬀerences, then dominance should hold in the sense speciﬁed in the axiom.
2.2.2 Baseline Representation
We can now state our baseline representation.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose contingent values hold. Then ≽ on Δ satisﬁes the axioms
of weak order, bounded bi-continuity, revealed consistency, comparable monotonicity,
comparable independence and dominance if and only if there exists a function 푤 :
푍 ×Δ퐴 → ℝ, satisfying
푤(푧,휆푝퐴 + (1−휆)푝′퐴) = 휆푤(푧, 푝퐴) + (1−휆)푤(푧, 푝′퐴), for all 푝퐴, 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
and constants 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1], 푧 ∈ 푍, such that the function 푊 :Δ → ℝ, given by
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎){(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)}
represents ≽.
In addition, another pair (푤˜, (휎˜푧)푧∈푍) represents ≽ in the above sense if and only if
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there exists constants 훼 > 0 and 훽 such that 푤˜ = 훼푤 + 훽, and 휎˜푧 = 휎푧 for all 푧 ∈
푍 with ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
For any lottery 푝 ∈ Δ and (푧, 푎) in the support of 푝, the representation provides
a ‘valuation’ of the procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎, 푝퐴). This valuation is given
by the expression
(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)
It is a weighted average of DM’s concern for outcomes and procedures. The subjective
weight 휎푧 is uniquely determined in our representation as long as ≽푧 is non-trivial.
We call 휎푧 a procedural weight. It quantiﬁes the strength of procedural concerns
relative to concerns for outcome in determining DM’s choice behavior. Under the
representation, once all the procedure-contingent outcomes have been appropriately
evaluated, the aggregation criterion across events is just like under expected utility.
The proof of the theorem is available in the Appendix.
2.2.3 Independent Procedural Weights
In Theorem 2.1 the procedural weights are a function of the outcome that DM re-
ceives. We now provide a representation in which there is a unique procedural weight
independent of DM’s outcomes; that is, DM evaluates a lottery 푝 ∈ Δ by the function:
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎){(1− 휎)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푤(푧, 푝퐴)}, where 휎 ∈ [0, 1].
It should be intuitively clear that to axiomatize this case we need to impose some form
of symmetry on DM’s preferences. We now make precise this notion of symmetry.
Note that for any 푎 ∈ 퐴, the indiﬀerence class of 푎 under ≽푧 (restricted to 퐴) shall
be denoted by
[푎]푧 = {푎′ ∈ 퐴 : 푎′ ∼푧 푎}
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Now consider the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.5. 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴 are equal gains w.r.t. ≽푧 and ≽푧′ if for any 푎˜ ∈ [푎]푧 ∩
[푎′]푧′ and 푎˜′ ∈ [푎′]푧 ∩ [푎]푧′
[(푧, 푎˜), 1/2; (푧′, 푎˜), 1/2] ∼ [(푧, 푎˜′), 1/2; (푧′, 푎˜′), 1/2]
The lotteries
푝 = [(푧, 푎), 1
2
; (푧′, 푎′), 1
2
], and 푞 = [(푧, 푎′), 1
2
; (푧′, 푎), 1
2
]
in Δ are symmetric if 푎 and 푎′ are equal gains w.r.t. ≽푧 and ≽푧′.
The equal gains deﬁnition gives us a condition under which the ‘subjective dif-
ference’ between two outcomes for the others, 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴, is considered the same by
the decision maker under both ≽푧 and ≽푧′ . To see this, consider changing the lot-
tery from [(푧, 푎˜), 1/2; (푧′, 푎˜), 1/2] to [(푧, 푎˜′), 1/2; (푧′, 푎˜′), 1/2]. Note that under both
these lotteries, there is no risk facing the others, and hence, there are no procedural
concerns to be considered. Suppose that 푎′ ≻푧 푎, or equivalently 푎˜′ ≻푧 푎˜. Then,
with probability 1
2
(i.e., in the event that DM gets 푧), the decision maker is made
better oﬀ due to the change. Since the change leaves her indiﬀerent overall, it must
be that in the complementary event (i.e., when she gets 푧′), the change makes her
worse oﬀ, and this ‘negative change’ must be of the same magnitude as the positive
one. In other words, the improvement under ≽푧 when the outcome facing the others
is changed from 푎˜ to 푎˜′ (or equivalently, from 푎 to 푎′) is of the same magnitude as
the improvement under ≽푧′ when the outcome facing the others is changed from 푎˜′
to 푎˜ (or equivalently, from 푎 to 푎′). The deﬁnition of symmetric lotteries builds on
the notion of equal gains to talk about tradeoﬀs in lotteries in which the others face
non-trivial risk (and hence outcomes and procedures need not be the same). Consider
the lotteries 푝 and 푞 in the deﬁnition above. Note that 푝퐴 = 푞퐴; that is the procedure
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is identical under both. Consider changing the lottery that DM faces from 푞 to 푝.
Suppose that 푎′ ≻푧 푎. Then, with probability 12 (i.e., in the event that DM gets 푧),
the decision maker is made worse oﬀ in terms of outcomes. Further, since 푎 and
푎′ are equal gains, with complementary probability (i.e., in the event that DM gets
푧′), she is made better oﬀ (again in terms of outcomes) ‘by an equal amount.’ Such
symmetric lotteries then allow us to elicit from behavior the strength of procedural
concerns across diﬀerent outcomes that DM receives.
The axiom that we need to ensure that procedural weights are independent of
DM’s own outcomes requires that if two allocation lotteries 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ are symmetric,
then the decision maker is indiﬀerent between them.
AXIOM: Symmetry
If 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ are symmetric, then 푝 ∼ 푞.
We then have the following representation result:
Theorem 2.2. Suppose contingent values hold. Then ≽ on Δ satisﬁes the axioms
of weak order, bounded bi-continuity, revealed consistency, comparable monotonic-
ity, comparable independence, dominance and symmetry if and only if there exists a
function 푤 : 푍 ×Δ퐴 → ℝ, satisfying
푤(푧,휆푝퐴 + (1−휆)푝′퐴) = 휆푤(푧, 푝퐴) + (1−휆)푤(푧, 푝′퐴), for all 푝퐴, 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
and a constant 휎 ∈ [0, 1], such that the function 푊 :Δ → ℝ, given by
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎){(1− 휎)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푤(푧, 푝퐴)}
represents ≽.
In addition, another pair (푤˜, 휎˜) represents ≽ in the above sense if and only if there
exists constants 훼 > 0 and 훽 such that 푤˜ = 훼푤 + 훽, and 휎˜ = 휎 whenever there exists
some 푧 ∈ 푍 with ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
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The proof is available in the appendix.
2.3 Appendix
2.3.1 Preliminaries
A Binary Relation
We deﬁne here a binary relation. First consider the following notation. For any 푝퐴 ∈
Δ퐴 and 푧 ∈ 푍, the indiﬀerence class of 푝퐴 under ≽푧 is denoted by
[푝퐴]푧 = {푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 : 푞퐴 ∼푧 푝퐴}
Further, Δ퐴/ ∼푧 shall denote the set of all such indiﬀerence classes. We deﬁne the
binary relations, ≽ˆ푧, ≻ˆ푧, ∼ˆ푧 on Δ퐴/∼푧 × Δ퐴/∼푧 as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.6. ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 (resp. ≻ˆ푧, resp. ∼ˆ푧) ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) if there exists
procedure-contingent outcomes (푧, 푎˜, 푝˜퐴) and (푧, 푎ˆ, 푝ˆ퐴) satisfying
푎˜ ∈ [푝퐴]푧, 푝˜퐴 ∈ [푞퐴]푧 and 푎ˆ ∈ [푝′퐴]푧, 푝ˆ퐴 ∈ [푞′퐴]푧
such that (푧, 푎˜, 푝˜퐴) is revealed better than (resp. revealed strictly better than, resp.
revealed indiﬀerent to) (푧, 푎ˆ, 푝ˆ퐴).
Remark 2.1. The axiom of revealed consistency implies that ∼ˆ푧 and ≻ˆ푧 are respec-
tively the symmetric and asymmetric components of ≽ˆ푧. That is,
([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧) iﬀ ([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧) & ([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧
([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧).
and,
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([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧)≻ˆ푧([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧) iﬀ ([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧) & ¬ ([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧)≽ˆ푧
([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧).
Remark 2.2. The deﬁnition of revealed better (resp. revealed strictly better, resp.
revealed indiﬀerent) implies that if ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 (resp. ≻ˆ푧, resp. ∼ˆ푧) ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧)
and there exists procedure contingent outcomes (푧, 푎˜, 푝˜퐴) and (푧, 푎ˆ, 푝ˆ퐴) such that
푎˜ ∈ [푝퐴]푧, 푝˜퐴 ∈ [푞퐴]푧 and 푎ˆ ∈ [푝′퐴]푧, 푝ˆ퐴 ∈ [푞′퐴]푧
then (푧, 푎˜, 푝˜퐴) is revealed better than (resp. revealed strictly better than, resp. revealed
indiﬀerent to) (푧, 푎ˆ, 푝ˆ퐴).
In the way of notation, note that we will write [푝′퐴]푧 ≽ˆ푧 (resp. ≻ˆ푧, resp. ∼ˆ푧) [푝′′퐴]푧
as a shorthand for ([푝′퐴]푧, [푝
′
퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 (resp. ≻ˆ푧, resp. ∼ˆ푧) ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푝′′퐴]푧).
A Topological Structure on Δ퐴/∼푧
We next endow the sets Δ퐴/∼푧, 푧 ∈ 푍, with a topology. For any [푝′퐴]푧, [푝′′퐴]푧 ∈
Δ퐴/∼푧, let,
∙ ][푝′퐴]푧, [푝′′퐴]푧[ = {[푝퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧 : 푝′퐴 ≻푧 푝퐴 ≻푧 푝′′퐴},
∙ ][푝′퐴]푧, → [ = {[푝퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧 : 푝퐴 ≻푧 푝′퐴}, and
∙ ]←, [푝′퐴]푧[ = {[푝퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧 : 푝′퐴 ≻푧 푝퐴}.
Since ≽푧 is a preference relation, it is natural to interpret these sets as preference
intervals. Let [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧 and [푞
∗
퐴]푧 denote the maximal and minimal indiﬀerence classes
respectively of ≽푧 in Δ퐴/∼푧, if such elements exist. That is,
[푞∗∗퐴 ]푧 = {푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 : 푝퐴 ≽푧 푝′퐴, for all 푝′퐴 ∈ Δ퐴},
and
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[푞∗퐴]푧 = {푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 : 푝′퐴 ≽푧 푝퐴, for all 푝′퐴 ∈ Δ퐴},
If [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧 and/or [푞
∗
퐴]푧 exist, then for any [푝
′
퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧 we shall write,
][푝′퐴]푧, → [ = ][푝′퐴]푧, [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧], and ]←, [푝′퐴]푧[ = [[푞∗퐴]푧, [푝′퐴]푧[
We endow the set Δ퐴/∼푧 with the order topology of ≽푧, i.e., the coarsest topology
containing all sets of the form ][푝′퐴]푧, → [ and ] ←, [푝′퐴]푧[, thus all sets of the form
][푝′퐴]푧, [푝
′′
퐴]푧[. We endow [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 with the product topology. A set of the type
퐶 = 퐼 × 퐼 ′ ⊆ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2, where 퐼 and 퐼 ′ are of the form ][푝′퐴]푧, [푝′′퐴]푧[, or ][푝′퐴]푧,
→ [, or ] ←, [푝′퐴]푧[ shall be referred to as a cube in [Δ퐴/∼푧]2. Our strategy in the
proof of the representation results below shall be to ﬁrst establish that ≽ˆ푧 is a weak
order ‘locally’ on such cubes, and then to extend this ‘globally’ by ‘tying together’
these cubes. Observe that if 퐶, 퐶 ′ ⊆ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 are cubes, then so is 퐶 ∩ 퐶 ′, if the
intersection happens to be non-empty. Further, if we can establish that ≽ˆ푧 is a weak
order on 퐶 and 퐶 ′, then revealed consistency implies that the derived rankings must
coincide on 퐶 ∩ 퐶 ′.
2.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
In this subsection we prove our baseline representation result. The proof of the
Theorem proceeds through several lemmas. First consider the following remark.
Remark 2.3. Our axioms (weak order, bi-continuity and comparable independence)
imply that ≽푧 satisﬁes the three axioms of the expected utility theorem; namely
∙ Weak Order: ≽푧 is complete and transitive.
∙ : vNM Continuity: For any 푝퐴, 푝′퐴, 푝′′퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, if 푝퐴 ≻푧 푝′퐴 ≻푧 푝′′퐴, then there
exists 휆, 휆′ ∈ (0, 1), such that
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휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푝′′퐴 ≻푧 푝′퐴 ≻푧 휆′푝퐴 + (1− 휆′)푝′′퐴
∙ vNM Independence: For any 푝퐴, 푝′퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, if 푝퐴 ≻푧 푝′퐴, then for any 푝′′퐴 ∈ Δ퐴,
휆 ∈ (0, 1]
휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푝′′퐴 ≻푧 휆푝′퐴 + (1− 휆′)푝′′퐴
Hence ≽푧 can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. That
is, ≽푧 admits a representation 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ that satisﬁes: ∀ 푝퐴, 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
푣푧(휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푞퐴) = 휆푣푧(푝퐴) + (1− 휆)푣푧(푞퐴)
In the remainder of this proof, we will therefore refer to any ≽푧 as a von Neumann-
Morgenstern preference (vNM preference, for short).
We next deﬁne a family of mixture set structures on Δ퐴/∼푧 and [Δ퐴/∼푧]2.
Mixture Sets: Consider any ≽푧. For any [푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧, and 휆 ∈ [0, 1], we
deﬁne a unique element 휆[푝퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푞퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧 as follows:4
휆[푝퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푞퐴]푧 = [휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푞퐴]푧
Note that ⊕ˆ푧 is well deﬁned since ≽푧 is a vNM preference, and so if we take any 푝′퐴
∈ [푝퐴]푧 and 푞′퐴 ∈ [푞퐴]푧, then 휆푝′퐴 + (1− 휆)푞′퐴 ∈ [휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푞퐴]푧.
Further, for any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2, and 휆 ∈ [0, 1], we deﬁne
a unique element 휆([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) ∈ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 as follows:5
휆([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) = (휆[푝퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푝′퐴]푧, 휆[푞퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧
(1− 휆)[푞′퐴]푧)
4Formally, ⊕ˆ푧 : Δ퐴/∼푧 × Δ퐴/∼푧 × [0, 1] → Δ퐴/∼푧.
5Formally, ⊕ˆ푧 : [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 × [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 × [0, 1] → [Δ퐴/∼푧]2. Observe that we are abusing
notation here by using the same notation ⊕ˆ푧 to denote ‘mixture operations’ on the sets Δ퐴/∼푧 and
[Δ퐴/∼푧]2. We do so because this should not cause any confusion, and it allows us to economize on
notation.
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That is,
휆([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) = ([휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푝′퐴]푧, [휆푞퐴 + (1− 휆)푞′퐴]푧)
Any subset of [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 that is itself a mixture set shall be referred to as a mixture
subset of [Δ퐴/∼푧]2. Note that because ≽푧 satisﬁes the vN-M independence condition,
any cube 퐶 ⊆ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 is a mixture subset of [Δ퐴/∼푧]2. In addition note the
following result about mixture subsets of [Δ퐴/∼푧]2. (The proof is standard, and
hence omitted).
Lemma 2.1. Every mixture subset of [Δ퐴/∼푧]2, in particular [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 itself, is
connected.
We shall now collect some useful notation to aid the exposition of the subsequent
results. We shall denote the restriction of ≽ˆ푧 to any set Ωˆ in [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 by (≽ˆ푧)Ωˆ.
Further, let
푖푛푡(Δ퐴/∼푧) = {[푝퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧 : [푝퐴]푧 ∕= [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧, [푞∗퐴]푧}
퐷∗ = {([푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 : [푞퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧}
퐷 = {([푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2 : [푞퐴]푧 ∈ 푖푛푡(Δ퐴/∼푧)}
Ω = Δ퐴/∼푧 × 푖푛푡(Δ퐴/∼푧), and Ω∗ = Ω ∪ 퐷∗.
Note that if ≽ˆ푧 does not have any extremal elements then, Δ퐴/∼푧 = 푖푛푡(Δ퐴/∼푧)
and 퐷∗ = 퐷. In that case 퐷∗ ⊆ 푖푛푡(Δ퐴/∼푧) × 푖푛푡(Δ퐴/∼푧) = Ω and so Ω∗ = Ω.
Lemma 2.2. Let ≻푧 ∕= ∅. For any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ Ω there exists a cube 퐶 containing
([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) such that ≽ˆ푧 restricted to 퐶 (denoted (≽ˆ푧)퐶), satisﬁes the following.
1. Weak Order: ≽ˆ푧 is complete and transitive on 퐶.
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2. vNM Continuity: Let ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧), ([푝
′′
퐴]푧, [푞
′′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶 be such that
([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧). Then there exists 휆, 휆′ ∈ (0, 1)
such that
휆([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′′퐴]푧,[푞′′퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 휆′([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1−
휆′)([푝′′퐴]푧,[푞
′′
퐴]푧).
3. vNM Independence: Let ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶 be such that ([푝퐴]푧,
[푞퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧). Then for any ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶, 휆 ∈ (0, 1],
휆([푝퐴]푧,[푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′′퐴]푧,[푞′′퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 휆([푝′퐴]푧,[푞′퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′′퐴]푧,[푞′′퐴]푧).
4. Monotonicity: for any ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧), ([푝
′′
퐴]푧, [푞
′′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶,
[푝′퐴]푧 ≽ˆ푧 [푝′′퐴]푧 and [푞′퐴]푧 ≽ˆ푧 [푞′′퐴]푧 ⇒ ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧).
5. Non Degeneracy: ≻ˆ푧 ∕= ∅.
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case of ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ Ω for which [푝퐴]푧 ∕= [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧 or [푞∗퐴]푧.
∙ (≽ˆ푧)퐶 is complete and transitive, for an appropriately deﬁned cube 퐶.
Pick any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ Ω. There may be two possibilities. First, 푝퐴 ≁푧 푞퐴, and
second 푝퐴 ∼푧 푞퐴. For the ﬁrst case assume without loss of generality that 푝퐴 ≻푧 푞퐴.
We can then ﬁnd 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴 such that 푎 ∼푧 푝퐴 ≻푧 푞퐴 ≻푧 푎′. The fact that we may ﬁnd
푎 as speciﬁed follows from the fact that any lottery in Δ퐴 has a certainty equivalent
with respect to ≽푧. On the other hand 푎′ exists as speciﬁed because ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ Ω
and so 푞퐴 /∈ [푞∗퐴]푧. Further, since ≽푧 is a vNM preference, it follows that there exists
휆∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that,
[푎, 휆∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗] ∼푧 푞퐴
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Now consider the case where, 푝퐴 ∼푧 푞퐴. In this case pick 푎, 푎′ ∈ [푞퐴]푧 (It is possible
that 푎 = 푎′). Then for any 휆 ∈ [0, 1], since ≽푧 is a vNM preference, we have that
[푎, 휆; 푎′, 1− 휆] ∼푧 푞퐴
In this case take any 휆∗ ∈ (0, 1). In either case therefore we can ﬁnd 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴,
and some 휆∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the above preference indiﬀerence condition holds.
Henceforth, without loss of generality, we shall consider 푞퐴 = [푎, 휆
∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗].
We know by the assumption of contingent values that there exists ≽푧′ ∕= ≽푧, with
≻푧′ ∕= ∅, such that for an appropriate choice of 푎, 푎′, there exists 푎, 푎 and 푎′, 푎′ that
satisfy,
푎 ∼푧′ 푎 ∼푧′ 푎 and 푎 ≻푧 푎 ≻푧 푎,
푎′ ∼푧′ 푎′ ∼푧′ 푎′ and 푎′ ≻푧 푎′ ≻푧 푎′
In particular, bi-continuity allows us to choose 푎, 푎 and 푎′, 푎′ in such a way that:
푞퐴 ≡ [푎, 휆∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗] ≻푧 푞퐴 ≻푧 [푎, 휆∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗] ≡ 푞퐴.
We can now deﬁne the cube 퐶 ⊆ Ω that the statement of the lemma requires us to
do. Deﬁne,
퐶 = ][푎]푧, [푎]푧[ × ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[
Further, let,
퐼푎 = {푎ˆ ∈ [푎]푧′ : 푎 ≽푧 푎ˆ ≽푧 푎}, & 퐼푎′ = {푎ˆ′ ∈ [푎′]푧′ : 푎′ ≽푧 푎ˆ′ ≽푧 푎′}.
Deﬁne a subset 푀 of Δ as follows:
푀 = {[(푧, 푎ˆ), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎ˆ′), 1− 휆∗] ∈ Δ : 푎ˆ ∈ 퐼푎, 푎ˆ′ ∈ 퐼푎′}.
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Consider any 푝′ = [(푧, 푎ˆ), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎ˆ′), 1 − 휆∗] ∈ 푀 . Since, 푎ˆ ∈ 퐼푎 ⊆ [푎]푧′ , 푎ˆ′ ∈ 퐼푎′ ⊆
[푎′]푧′ and ≽푧′ is a vNM preference, it follows that
푝′퐴 = [푎ˆ, 휆
∗; 푎ˆ′, 1− 휆∗] ∼푧′ [푎, 휆∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗] = 푞퐴.
Therefore, for any 푝′, 푝′′ ∈ 푀 ,
[푎(푧′, 푝′)]푧′ = [푎(푧′, 푝′′)]푧′ = [푎′]푧′ and [푝′퐴]푧′ = [푝
′′
퐴]푧′ = [푞퐴]푧′ .
That is, any 푝′, 푝′′ ∈ 푀 are comparable at 푧, and accordingly if 푝′ ≻ 푝′′, then
the procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎(푧, 푝′), 푝′퐴) is revealed strictly better than the
procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎(푧, 푝′′), 푝′′퐴), and if 푝
′ ∼ 푝′′, then (푧, 푎(푧, 푝′), 푝′퐴) is
revealed indiﬀerent to (푧, 푎(푧, 푝′′), 푝′′퐴). Hence,
푝′ ≻ 푝′′ ⇒ ([푎(푧, 푝′)]푧, [푝′퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푎(푧, 푝′′)]푧, [푝′′퐴]푧)
푝′ ∼ 푝′′ ⇒ ([푎(푧, 푝′)]푧, [푝′퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푎(푧, 푝′′)]푧, [푝′′퐴]푧)
Consider any ([푝ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶. Since, 푎 ≻푧 푝ˆ퐴 ≻푧 푎, it follows that there exists 푎ˆ ∈
퐼푎 such that 푎ˆ ∼푧 푝ˆ퐴.6 Further, since ≽푧 is a vNM preference, it follows that
[푎ˆ, 휆∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗] ≻푧 푞퐴 ≻푧 푞ˆ퐴 ≻푧 푞퐴 ≻푧 [푎ˆ, 휆∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗].
It follows from bi-continuity that there exists 푎ˆ′ ∈ 퐼푎′ such that
푞ˆ퐴 ∼푧 [푎ˆ, 휆∗; 푎ˆ′, 1− 휆∗].
That is for any ([푝ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶, there exists
푝′ = [(푧, 푎ˆ), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎ˆ′), 1− 휆∗] ∈ 푀
such that 푝ˆ퐴 ∼푧 푎(푧, 푝′) = 푎ˆ and 푞ˆ퐴 ∼푧 푝′퐴 = [푎ˆ, 휆∗; 푎ˆ′, 1− 휆∗]. Accordingly, ≽ˆ푧 is a
weak order on 퐶.
6This follows since [푎]푧′ is a connected subset of 퐴. Note that
푊1 = {푎˜ ∈ [푎]푧′ : 푎˜ ≽푧 푝ˆ퐴}, & 푊2 = {푎˜ ∈ [푎]푧′ : 푝ˆ퐴 ≽푧 푎˜}
form a separation of [푎]푧′ , and hence their intersection must be nonempty.
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∙ (≽ˆ푧)퐶 satisﬁes vNM Continuity.
First we establish that for any 푝˜, 푝ˆ ∈ 푀 , any 휆 ∈ [0, 1], 휆푝˜ ⊕ (1− 휆)푝ˆ ∈ 푀 . Let
푝˜ = [(푧, 푎˜), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎˜′), 1− 휆∗] & 푝ˆ = [(푧, 푎ˆ), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎ˆ′), 1− 휆∗]
Further let 푎휆 ∈ 퐼푎 be such that,
푎휆 ∼푧 [푎˜, 휆; 푎ˆ, 1− 휆].
Let,
푞˜퐴 = 휆[푎˜, 휆
∗; 푎˜′, 1− 휆∗] + (1− 휆)[푎ˆ, 휆∗; 푎ˆ′, 1− 휆∗]
Since ≽푧 is a vNM preference, it follows that
[푎휆, 휆
∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗] ≽푧 푞퐴 ≽푧 푞˜퐴 ≽푧 푞퐴 ≽푧 [푎휆, 휆∗; 푎′, 1− 휆∗],
with strict preference holding at least somewhere. Bi-ontinuity in conjunction with
the fact the [푎′]푧′ is a connected subset of 퐴 implies that there exists, 푎′휆 ∈ 퐼푎′ , such
that
[푎휆, 휆
∗; 푎′휆, 1− 휆∗] ∼푧 푞˜퐴.
Hence,
[(푧, 푎휆), 휆
∗; (푧′, 푎′휆), 1− 휆∗] = 휆푝˜ ⊕ (1− 휆)푝ˆ.
We now establish that (≽ˆ푧)퐶 satisﬁes the vN-M Continuity axiom. Note that this is
equivalent to proving the following: For any 푝, 푝′, 푝′′ ∈ 푀 such that 푝 ≻ 푝′ ≻ 푝′′,
there exists 휆, 휆′ ∈ (0, 1), such that:
휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′ ≻ 푝′ ≻ 휆′푝 ⊕ (1− 휆′)푝′′
Suppose otherwise – say that 푝′ ≽ 휆푝 ⊕ (1−휆)푝′′ for all 휆 ∈ (0, 1). We proved above
that for all 휆 ∈ [0, 1] there exists 푎휆 ∈ 퐼푎, 푎′휆 ∈ 퐼푎′ such that,
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[(푧, 푎휆), 휆
∗; (푧′, 푎′휆); 1− 휆∗] = 휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′.
Denote,
푝 = [(푧, 푎˜), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎˜′), 1− 휆∗]
We may then construct a sequence (푎휆푘 , 푎
′
휆푘
)푘∈ℤ+ ⊆ 퐼푎 × 퐼푎′ converging to (푎˜, 푎˜′) ∈
퐼푎 × 퐼푎′ , such that for all 푘 ∈ ℤ+,
푝′ ≽ 휆푘푝 ⊕ (1− 휆푘)푝′′ = [(푧, 푎휆푘), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎′휆푘); 1− 휆∗]
Let
Ξ = {(푎휆푘 , 푎′휆푘) ∈ 퐼푎 × 퐼푎′ : 푝′ ≽ [(푧, 푎휆푘), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎′휆푘); 1− 휆∗]}
By Bi-continuity the set Ξ is closed in 퐼푎 × 퐼푎′ . It then follows that (푎˜, 푎˜′) ∈ Ξ, that
is 푝′ ≽ 푝 = [(푧, 푎˜), 휆∗; (푧′, 푎˜′), 1− 휆∗], which is absurd.
∙ (≽ˆ푧)퐶 satisﬁes vNM Independence.
Now, let ([푝1퐴]푧, [푞
1
퐴]푧), ([푝
2
퐴]푧, [푞
2
퐴]푧), ([푝
3
퐴]푧, [푞
3
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶 be such that ([푝1퐴]푧, [푞1퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧
([푝2퐴]푧, [푞
2
퐴]푧). We need to establish that for any 휆 ∈ (0, 1],
휆([푝1퐴]푧, [푞
1
퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝3퐴]푧, [푞3퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 휆([푝2퐴]푧, [푞2퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝3퐴]푧, [푞3퐴]푧).
We know from the analysis above that there exists 푝, 푝′, 푝′′ ∈ 푀 such that ([푎(푧, 푝)]푧,
[푝퐴]푧) = ([푝
1
퐴]푧, [푞
1
퐴]푧), ([푎(푧, 푝
′)]푧, [푝′퐴]푧) = ([푝
2
퐴]푧, [푞
2
퐴]푧), ([푎(푧, 푝
′′)]푧 ,[푝′′퐴]푧) = ([푝
3
퐴]푧,
[푞3퐴]푧), and 푝 ≻ 푝′. By comparable independence, it follows that for any 휆 ∈ (0, 1]
휆푝⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′ ≻ 휆푝′ ⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′
Accordingly, it follows that
([푎(푧, 휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′)]푧,[(휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′)퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧
([푎(푧, 휆푝′ ⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′)]푧, [(휆푝′ ⊕ (1− 휆)푝′′)퐴]푧).
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Or,
([휆푎(푧, 푝) + (1− 휆)푎(푧, 푝′′)]푧,[휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푝′′퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧
([휆푎(푧, 푝′) + (1− 휆)푎(푧, 푝′′)]푧, [휆푝′퐴 + (1− 휆)푝′′퐴]푧).
That is,
(휆[푎(푧, 푝)]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푎(푧, 푝′′)]푧, 휆[푝퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푝′′퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧
(휆[푎(푧, 푝′)]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푎(푧, 푝′′)]푧, 휆[푝′퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 [푝′′퐴]푧).
Or,
(휆[푝1퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푝3퐴]푧, 휆[푞1퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푞3퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧
(휆[푝2퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푝3퐴]푧, 휆[푞2퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푞3퐴]푧).
Or,
휆([푝1퐴]푧, [푞
1
퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝3퐴]푧, [푞3퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 휆([푝2퐴]푧, [푞2퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝3퐴]푧, [푞3퐴]푧).
Hence, (≽ˆ푧)퐶 satisﬁes the vN-M Independence axiom.
∙ (≽ˆ푧)퐶 satisﬁes Monotonicity.
This follows immediately from conditional monotonicity
∙ (≽ˆ푧)퐶 is Non Degenerate.
This follows immediately from the assumption made in the lemma that ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
The proof for the case when [푝퐴]푧 is equal to either [푞
∗∗
퐴 ]푧, [푞
∗
퐴]푧 is exactly along
similar lines. When [푝퐴]푧 = [푞
∗∗
퐴 ]푧, take 푎 = 푎 in the above proof, and deﬁne the cube
퐶 as follows:
퐶 = ][푎]푧, [푎]푧] × ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[ .
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The rest of the details are exactly identical. Similarly, when [푝퐴]푧 = [푞
∗
퐴]푧, take 푎 =
푎 in the above proof, and deﬁne
퐶 = [[푎]푧, [푎]푧[ × ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[ .
Lemma 2.3. (≽ˆ푧)Ω∗ is a weak order. Further, there exists
(i) a function 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ that represents ≽푧 and satisﬁes: for all 휆 ∈ [0, 1], 푝퐴, 푞퐴
∈ Δ퐴,
푣푧(휆푝퐴 + (1 − 휆)푞퐴) = 휆푣푧(푝퐴) + (1 − 휆)푣푧(푞퐴), and
(ii) a constant 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1],
such that the function 푉푧 : Ω
∗ → ℝ given by
푉푧([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) = (1− 휎푧)푣푧(푝퐴) + 휎푧푣푧(푞퐴)
represents (≽ˆ푧)Ω∗. Further, another pair (푣˜푧, 휎˜푧) represents (≽ˆ푧)Ω∗ in the above sense
iﬀ 푣˜푧 is a positive aﬃne transformation of 푣푧 and 휎˜푧 = 휎푧, for all 푧 ∈ 푍 such that
≻푧 ∕= ∅.
Proof. First consider those 푧 ∈ 푍 for which ≻푧 ∕= ∅. From Lemma 2.2 it follows that
for any ([푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ 퐷, there exists a cube containing ([푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), which we can
take to be
퐶[푞퐴]푧 = ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[ × ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[ ⊆ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2
such that ≽ˆ푧 restricted to 퐶[푞퐴]푧 satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms of the Anscombe Aumann
Theorem (for ﬁnite states) – weak order, vN-M continuity, vN-M independence, mono-
tonicity and non-degeneracy. It follows that there exists a function 푣푞퐴푧 : ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[
→ ℝ that is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation, and a constant 휎푞퐴푧 ∈ [0, 1]
that is unique, such that the function 푉 푞퐴푧 : 퐶[푞퐴]푧 → ℝ deﬁned by,
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푉 푞퐴푧 ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) = (1− 휎푞퐴푧 )푣푞퐴푧 (푝′퐴) + 휎푞퐴푧 푣푞퐴푧 (푞′퐴)
represents (≽ˆ푧)퐶[푞퐴]푧 . Thats is for all ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧), ([푝
′′
퐴]푧, [푞
′′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶[푞퐴]푧 ,
([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧) if and only if 푉 푞퐴푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) ≥ 푉 푞퐴푧 ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧)
Further note that the function 푣푧 satisﬁes: for all 휆 ∈ [0, 1], [푝퐴]푧, [푝′퐴]푧 ∈ ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[,
푣푧(휆[푝퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1 − 휆)[푝′퐴]푧) = 휆푣푧([푝퐴]푧) + (1 − 휆)푣푧([푝′퐴]푧).
In addition, for any ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶[푞퐴]푧 , there exists [푞ˆ퐴]푧 ∈ ][푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧[ such that
([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧).
Note that ≽ˆ푧 restricted to 퐷∗ is complete. This follows since, any two degenerate
lotteries like [(푧, 푎), 1] and [(푧, 푎′), 1] are comparable at 푧, and accordingly
([푎]푧, [푎]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푎′]푧, [푎′]푧) if (푧, 푎) ≻푧 (푧, 푎′),
or,
([푎]푧, [푎]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푎′]푧, [푎′]푧) if (푧, 푎) ∼푧 (푧, 푎′). 7
Now deﬁne 푂 = (∪[푞퐴]푧∈퐷 퐶[푞퐴]푧) ∪ 퐷∗. We will next show that ≽ˆ푧 restricted to 푂 is
a weak order. Pick any ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶[푞퐴]푧 , ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶[푝퐴]푧 . We know that
there exists [푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푝ˆ퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/ ∼푧 such that
([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) and ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푝ˆ퐴]푧, [푝ˆ퐴]푧).
Accordingly, it follows that
([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧) if ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) ≻ˆ푧 ([푝ˆ퐴]푧, [푝ˆ퐴]푧),
or,
([푝′퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푝′′퐴]푧, [푞′′퐴]푧) if ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푝ˆ퐴]푧, [푝ˆ퐴]푧).
7Note that {[푎]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/ ∼푧 : 푎 ∈ 퐴} = Δ퐴/ ∼푧.
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Hence, (≽ˆ푧)푂 is a weak order.
Now consider any two cubes 퐶[푞퐴]푧 and 퐶[푝퐴]푧 that intersect. Pick ([푞
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧),
([푞′′퐴]푧, [푞
′′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶[푞퐴]푧 ∩ 퐶[푝퐴]푧 , [푞′퐴]푧 ∕= [푞′′퐴]푧, and recalibrate the function 푣푝퐴푧 by setting
푣푝퐴푧 ([푞
′
퐴]푧) = 푣
푞퐴
푧 ([푞
′
퐴]푧) and 푣
푝퐴
푧 ([푞
′′
퐴]푧) = 푣
푞퐴
푧 ([푞
′′
퐴]푧)
Note that by the uniqueness result of the Anscombe Aumann Theorem, the pair
(푣푝퐴푧 , 휎
푝퐴
푧 ) continues to represent (≽ˆ푧)퐶[푝퐴] . Further, 푣
푝퐴
푧 = 푣
푞퐴
푧 on ][푝퐴]푧, [푝퐴]푧[ ∩
][푞
퐴
]푧, [푞퐴]푧[. Hence it follows that 휎
푝퐴
푧 = 휎
푞퐴
푧 . Next consider [푞퐴]푧, [푝퐴]푧 such that
cubes 퐶[푞퐴]푧 and 퐶[푝퐴]푧 do not intersect. Since the set 퐷 is connected, ([푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧)
and ([푝퐴]푧, [푝퐴]푧) can be linked by ﬁnitely many cubes; that is there are ﬁnitely
many cubes 퐶[푝1퐴]푧 , . . . , 퐶[푝
푚
퐴 ]푧
, such that 퐶[푝1퐴]푧 = 퐶[푞퐴]푧 , 퐶[푝
푚
퐴 ]푧
= 퐶[푝퐴]푧 , and
each subsequent pairs of 퐶[푝푗퐴]푧
’s intersect. Further, we can take 퐶[푝푗퐴]푧
∩ 퐶[푝푗−푘퐴 ]푧 =
∅ for every 푘 ≥ 2. We can then repeat the above re-calibration exercise over pairs
of intersecting cubes in the link. This exercise allows us to deﬁne a function 푣푧 on
푖푛푡(Δ퐴/ ∼푧), as well as establish 휎푞퐴푧 = 휎푝퐴푧 = 휎푧, for all 푞퐴 ∕= 푝퐴, [푞퐴]푧, [푝퐴]푧 ∈
푖푛푡(Δ퐴/ ∼푧). Finally, for [푝퐴]푧 = [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧, or [푞∗퐴]푧 deﬁne
푣푧([푝퐴]푧) = lim
휆→1
푣푧(휆[푝퐴]푧⊕ˆ푧(1− 휆)[푝퐴]푧),
where [푝퐴]푧 is any element of 푖푛푡(Δ퐴/ ∼푧).
We next establish the following claim: for any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ Ω∗ there exists
([푝′퐴]푧, [푝
′
퐴]푧) in 퐷
∗ such that ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푝′퐴]푧). To that end, deﬁne the
function 푉푧 : Ω
∗ → ℝ by
푉푧([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) = (1− 휎푧)푣푧([푝퐴]푧) + 휎푧푣푧([푞퐴]푧)
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where 푣푧 and 휎푧 are as deﬁned above. For any [푞ˆ퐴]푧 ∈ 푖푛푡(Δ퐴/ ∼푧), let
퐽푞ˆ퐴 = {([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ Ω : 푉푧([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) = 푉푧([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧)}
We claim that for all ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐽푞ˆ퐴 , ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧).
To see this note that, Lemma 2.2 guarantees that for any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ 퐽푞ˆ퐴 , there
exists a cube 퐶 containing ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) such that (≽ˆ푧)퐶 satisﬁes the three vN-M ax-
ioms of Weak Order, vNM Continuity and Independence on the mixture set (퐶, ⊕ˆ푧).
Accordingly (≽ˆ푧)퐶 can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion. Consider two such cubes 퐶1 and 퐶2 that intersect. Because of the axiom of
revealed consistency, it follows that for any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐶1 ∩ 퐶2,
([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) (≽ˆ푧)퐶1 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) iﬀ ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) (≽ˆ푧)퐶2 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧).
Further note that if 푉퐶1 and 푉퐶2 are two vN-M utility functions that represent (≽ˆ푧)퐶1
and (≽ˆ푧)퐶2 respectively, these functions can be re-calibrated (in a manner similar to
that used in Step 2) and set equal on 퐶1 ∩ 퐶2.
Now, consider the cube 퐶[푞ˆ퐴]푧 around ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧). We have already established
above that (≽ˆ푧)퐶[푞ˆ퐴]푧 is represented by the function 푉푧. Further, 퐽푞ˆ퐴 is connected.
Accordingly, ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) can be linked to any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ 퐽푞ˆ퐴 using a ﬁnite
number of cubes. On each pair of intersecting cubes ≽ˆ푧 must coincide as suggested
in the last paragraph. Furthermore the vN-M representations of ≽ˆ푧 on these cubes
can be re-calibrated and brought in line with 푉푧. Hence, we may conclude that for
all ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ 퐽푞ˆ퐴 , ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧).
Note that if 휎푧 ∕= 1, or if [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧 and [푞∗퐴]푧 do not exist, then we are done establishing
our claim. However, if 휎푧 = 1, and either [푞
∗∗
퐴 ]푧 or [푞
∗
퐴]푧 exists then members of the
set
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퐵 = {([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ Ω : [푝퐴]푧 = [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧 or [푞∗퐴]푧}
are not indiﬀerent to any element of 퐷. In this case it is straightforward to verify
that for any ([푞∗∗퐴 ]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ 퐵, ([푞∗∗퐴 ]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푞∗∗퐴 ]푧, [푞∗∗퐴 ]푧). Similarly, for any
([푞∗퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∈ 퐵, ([푞∗퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푞∗퐴]푧, [푞∗퐴]푧).
Now consider any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ Ω∗. From the argument just made,
we know that there exists ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧), ([푞˜퐴]푧, [푞˜퐴]푧) ∈ 퐷∗, such that ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧)
∼ˆ푧 ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) and ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푞˜퐴]푧, [푞˜퐴]푧). Hence,
([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) iﬀ ([푞ˆ퐴]푧, [푞ˆ퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 ([푞˜퐴]푧, [푞˜퐴]푧).
Clearly it also follows that,
([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ≽ˆ푧 ([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) ⇔ 푉푧(([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧)) ≥ 푉푧(([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧)).
Note that we may (with an abuse of notation) deﬁne the function 푣푧 on Δ퐴 by simply
giving all elements of an equivalence class, say [푝퐴]푧, the value 푣푧([푝퐴]푧). It then
follows that for all 휆 ∈ [0, 1], 푝퐴, 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴,
푣푧(휆푝퐴 + (1 − 휆)푞퐴) = 휆푣푧(푝퐴) + (1 − 휆)푣푧(푞퐴).
The uniqueness statement is simply a re-statement of the essential uniqueness result
in the ﬁrst half of the proof. This then completes the proof for those 푧 ∈ 푍 for which
≻푧 ∕= ∅.
The proof for those 푧 ∈ 푍 for which ≻푧 = ∅ is trivial. Note that for this case
[Δ퐴/∼푧 × Δ퐴/∼푧] is a singleton. We can take 푣푧 to be any constant function, and
휎푧 to be any number in [0, 1].
Remark 2.4. Note that the function 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ in a von-Neumann Morgenstern
utility representation of the preference relation ≽푧. We know that if there is some
other function 푣ˆ푧 that also happens to be a vN-M utility representation of ≽푧, then 푣푧
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and 푣ˆ푧 must be positive aﬃne transformations of one another. This is a fact that we
shall draw on below.
We next establish that any procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎, 푝퐴) is revealed
indiﬀerent to a procedure contingent outcome (푧, 푎˜, 푎˜) in which the outcome and pro-
cedure are the same. The result follows immediately when we combine the conclusion
of the last lemma with the following one.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose ≽푧 satisﬁes stochastic dominance and vN-M continuity. If ≻푧
∕= ∅, then there does not exist 푝 ∈ Δ such that (a) 푝퐴 ≻푧 푝퐴,푧 and 푝퐴 is the maximal
element of ≽푧, or (b) 푝퐴,푧 ≻푧 푝퐴 and 푝퐴 is the minimal element of ≽푧.
Proof. Consider any 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴. Note the following mutually exclusive possibilities:
[A] 푎 ∼푧 푎′ for all 푎, 푎′ in the support of 푞퐴: In this case it must be that 푞퐴 ∼푧 푎 for
any 푎 in the support of 푞퐴. To see this assume otherwise – say 푞퐴 ≻푧 푎. Given that
≻푧 ∕= ∅, it follows that there exists 푎′′ satisfying 푎′′ ≻푧 푎 or 푎 ≻푧 푎′′. Assume it is the
former.8 Note that 푎′′ ﬁrst order stochastically dominates 푞퐴; hence we have: 푎′′ ≻
푞퐴 ≻푧 푎. But then by vN-M Continuity, there exists 휆 ∈ (0, 1), such that 푞퐴 ≻푧 휆푎′′
+ (1− 휆)푎′. But the lottery 휆푎′′ + (1− 휆)푎′ ﬁrst order stochastically dominates 푞퐴!
[B] 푎 ≻푧 푎′ for some 푎, 푎′ in the support of 푞퐴: In this case there exists 푎, 푎 in
the support of 푞퐴 such that 푎 ≻푧 푞퐴 ≻푧 푎. This claim is again easily established by
appealing to the fact that ≽푧 satisﬁes stochastic dominance; so we omit the details
here.
Now we proceed to prove the Lemma. Suppose there exists 푝 ∈ Δ such that 푝퐴 ≻푧
푝퐴,푧 and 푝퐴 is the maximal element of ≽푧. Then we know from above that there
exists 푎 in the support of 푝퐴,푧 such that 푝퐴,푧 ≽푧 푎. Hence, 푝퐴 ≻푧 푎. Clearly, 푎 is
in the support of 푝퐴. This implies (following Case B above) that there exists 푎
′ in
8The latter case is dealt analogously
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the support of 푝퐴 such that 푎
′ ≻푧 푝퐴. But this contradicts that 푝퐴 is the maximal
element of ≽푧. The case of 푝퐴,푧 ≻푧 푝퐴 and 푝퐴 is the minimal element of ≽푧 not being
possible can be handled analogously.
The last Lemma together with Lemma 2.3 allow us to conclude:
Lemma 2.5. For any 푝 ∈ Δ, and (푧, 푎) in the support of 푝, the procedure contingent
outcome (푧,푎,푝퐴) is revealed indiﬀerent to a procedure contingent outcome (푧, 푎˜, 푎˜) ∈
Δ that is unique in the following sense: if (푧, 푎ˆ, 푎ˆ) is another procedure contingent
outcome that is revealed indiﬀerent to (푧,푎,푝퐴), then 푎˜ ∼푧 푎ˆ. Further, there exists a
function 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ, and a constant 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1] such that
푣푧(푎˜) = (1− 휎푧)푣푧(푎) + 휎푧푣푧(푝퐴)
The function 푣푧 is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation, and the constant 휎푧 is
unique for all 푧 such that ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
Proof. Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4 allows us to conclude that there exists [푞퐴]푧 ∈
Δ퐴/∼푧 such that
([푎]푧, [푝퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푞퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧).
Further, we know that there exists 푎˜ ∈ 퐴 such that 푎˜ ∼푧 푞퐴. Thus,
([푎]푧, [푝퐴]푧) ∼ˆ푧 ([푎˜]푧, [푎˜]푧).
and it follows from Remark 2.2 that the procedure-contingent outcome (푧,푎,푝퐴) is
revealed indiﬀerent to the procedure contingent outcome (푧, 푎˜, 푎˜).
The following corollary then follows.
Corollary 2.1. Every lottery 푝 ∈ Δ has a procedure-adjusted equivalent 휋(푝) ∈ Δ.
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We now state three intermediary results that leads us towards our representation.
First, by boundedness it follows that there exists 푎∗ ∈ 퐴, such that for all 푝 ∈ Δ
there exists 푧, 푧 ∈ 푍 satisfying (푧, 푎∗) ≽ 푝 ≽ (푧, 푎∗). This fact allows us to prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.6. For any 푝 ∈ Δ, there exists 푧∗(푝) ∈ 푍 such that 푝 ∼ (푧∗(푝), 푎∗).
Proof. Pick any 푝 ∈ Δ. As stated above, there exists 푎∗ ∈ 퐴, such that for all 푝 ∈ Δ
there exists 푧, 푧 ∈ 푍 satisfying (푧, 푎∗) ≽ 푝 ≽ (푧, 푎∗). If either of those preferences is
an indiﬀerence, then we are done. So assume that (푧, 푎∗) ≻ 푝 ≻ (푧, 푎∗). Then, since
≽푎∗ satisﬁes vNM continuity, it follows that there exists 휆′, 휆′′ ∈ (0, 1), 휆′ > 휆′′, such
that
휆′(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆′)(푧, 푎∗) ≻ 푝 ≻ 휆′′(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆′′)(푧, 푎∗).
Let,
Λ = {휆 ∈ [0, 1] : 푝 ≻ 휆(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆)(푧, 푎∗)}
and let 휆∗ = 푠푢푝 Λ. We claim that 푝 ∼ 휆∗(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆∗)(푧, 푎∗). To see this,
suppose otherwise.
First, suppose that 푝 ≻ 휆∗(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆∗)(푧, 푎∗). This implies that 휆∗ ∈ Λ.
Note that,
휆′(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆′)(푧, 푎∗) ≻ 푝 ≻ 휆∗(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆∗)(푧, 푎∗)
This implies that there exists 휆 ∈ (0, 1), such that letting 휆˜ = 휆휆′ + (1 − 휆)휆∗, we
have by vNM continuity of ≽푎∗ that
푝 ≻ 휆˜(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆˜)(푧, 푎∗).
But note that 휆′ > 휆∗, and hence 휆˜ > 휆∗. But at the same time 휆˜ ∈ Λ, which
contradicts the fact that 휆∗ = sup Λ
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Next, suppose that 휆∗(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆∗)(푧, 푎∗) ≻ 푝. Then by vNM continuity of
≽푎∗ , there exists 휆 ∈ (0, 1) such that letting 휆ˆ = 휆휆∗ + (1 − 휆)휆′′,
휆ˆ(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆ˆ)(푧, 푎∗) ≻ 푝
It follows that 휆ˆ is an upper bound of Λ. But at the same time, since 휆∗ > 휆′′, 휆∗ >
휆ˆ, which contradicts the fact that 휆∗ = sup Λ. Finally note that there exists 푧∗ ∈ 푍
such that (푧∗, 푎∗) ∼ (휆∗푧 + (1 − 휆∗)푧, 푎∗) = 휆∗(푧, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆∗)(푧, 푎∗), which allows
us to establish the claim of the lemma.
Let,
푝 = [(푧1, 푎1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ,
and let,
휋(푝) = [(푧1, 푎˜1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ
be its procedure-adjusted equivalent. We know from Lemma 2.6 that for each (푧푘, 푎˜푘),
there exists (푧∗(푧푘, 푎˜푘), 푎∗) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 such that (푧푘, 푎˜푘) ∼ (푧∗(푧푘, 푎˜푘), 푎∗). The axiom
of dominance then allows us to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. Let,
푝 = [(푧1, 푎1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ,
and let,
휋(푝) = [(푧1, 푎˜1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ
be its procedure-adjusted equivalent. Then,
푝 ∼ [(푧∗(푧1, 푎˜1), 푎∗), 푝(푧1, 푎1), . . . , (푧∗(푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 푎∗), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)].
48
Proof. Observe that if the support of 푝 is singleton, that is, 푝 is a degenerate lottery,
then the conclusion follows immediately from Lemma 2.6. So assume otherwise.
Further, denote
푞∗ ≡ [(푧∗(푧1, 푎˜1), 푎∗), 푝(푧1, 푎1), . . . , (푧∗(푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 푎∗), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)],
and suppose towards a contradiction that 푝 ≁ 푞∗ – say 푝 ≻ 푞∗ (The case of 푞∗ ≻ 푝
is treated analogously). Suppose ﬁrst that there exists (푧, 푎∗), (푧′, 푎∗) in the support
of 푞∗, denoted 푆[푞∗], such that (푧, 푎∗) ≻ (푧′, 푎∗). Let (푧′′, 푎∗) ∈ 푆[푞∗] be such that
(푧′′, 푎∗) ≽ (푧, 푎∗) for all (푧, 푎∗) ∈ 푆[푞∗]. Dominance then implies that (푧′′, 푎∗) ≻ 푝,
and so (푧′′, 푎∗) ≻ 푝 ≻ 푞∗. By vNM continuity of ≽푎∗ it follows that there exists 휆 ∈
(0, 1) such that 푝 ≻ 휆(푧′′, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆)푞∗. By dominance though, 휆(푧′′, 푎∗) + (1 −
휆)푞∗ ≻ 푝, which is absurd.
Next consider the case where (푧, 푎∗) ∼ (푧′, 푎∗) for all (푧, 푎∗), (푧′, 푎∗) ∈ 푆[푞∗]. We know
(from continuity) that for any 푝 ∈ Δ there exists (푧′′, 푎∗) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 such that (푧′′, 푎∗)
≽ 푝 ≻ 푞∗. It follows that there exists 휆 ∈ (0, 1) such that 푝 ≻ 휆(푧′′, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆)푞∗.
But by dominance 휆(푧′′, 푎∗) + (1 − 휆)푞∗ ≻ 푝, which is absurd.
Finally, the following Lemma is an immediate consequence of comparable indepen-
dence. The proof is straightforward and we omit the details.
Lemma 2.8. Let (푧, 푝퐴), (푧, 푞퐴) ∈ Δ. Then, for any 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
휆(푧, 푝퐴) + (1− 휆)(푧, 푞퐴) ∼ 휆(푧∗(푧, 푝퐴), 푎∗) + (1− 휆)(푧∗(푧, 푞퐴), 푎∗),
where (푧∗(푧, 푝퐴), 푎∗), (푧∗(푧, 푞퐴), 푎∗) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 are such that
(푧∗(푧, 푝퐴), 푎∗) ∼ (푧, 푝퐴) and (푧∗(푧, 푞퐴), 푎∗) ∼ (푧, 푞퐴).
Now deﬁne,
49
Δ푎∗ = {(푝푍 , 푎∗) ∈ Δ : 푝푍 ∈ Δ푍}.
and let ≽∗ be the restriction of ≽ to Δ푎∗ . Note that our axioms imply that ≽∗
satisﬁes the axioms of the expected utility theorem, and so it follows that there exists
an expected utility functional 푊 : Δ푎∗ → ℝ that represents ≽∗. Further, following
Lemma 2.6 we may ‘extend’ the function to the whole of Δ. Deﬁne 푊 : Δ → ℝ as
푊 (푝) = 푊 (푧∗(푝), 푎∗)
where (푧∗(푝), 푎∗) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 is such that 푝 ∼ (푧∗(푝), 푎∗). Clearly, the function 푊
represents ≽.
Let,
휋(푝) = [(푧1, 푎˜1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ
denote the procedure-adjusted equivalent of
푝 = [(푧1, 푎1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ.
Applying Lemma 2.7 then gives us that
푊 (푝) =
퐾∑
푘=1
푝(푧푘, 푎푘)푊 (푧∗(푧푘, 푎˜푘), 푎∗) =
퐾∑
푘=1
푝(푧푘, 푎푘)푊 (푧푘, 푎˜푘)
Next, deﬁne the function 푤 : 푍 × Δ퐴 → ℝ as follows: for any 푝 = (푧, 푝퐴) ∈ Δ, let
푤(푧, 푝퐴) = 푊 (푝)
For any 푧 ∈ 푍, it follows from Lemma 2.8 that the function 푤(푧, .) : Δ퐴 → ℝ is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern representation of ≽푧. Accordingly, 푤(푧, .) is a positive aﬃne
transformation of the function 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ that we derived in Lemma 2.3. Hence it
follows that
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)
푝(푧, 푎){(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푎) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)}
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represents ≽. This completes the proof of suﬃciency of the axioms. Necessity of the
axioms as well as the proof of the uniqueness statement is straightforward and we do
not provide the details here.
2.3.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Begin with a pair (푤, (휎푧)푧∈푍) that represents≽ in the sense of Theorem 2.1. Consider
any 푧, 푧′ ∈ 푍 with ≻푧, ≻푧′ ∕= ∅. There are two cases to consider. First suppose that
there exists 푎ˆ ∈ 퐴 such that
{푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧 푎ˆ} ∕= {푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧′ 푎ˆ}
In this case, there exists 푎 ∈ [푎ˆ]푧′ , 푎′ ∈ [푎ˆ]푧 satisfying 푎 ≻푧 푎ˆ and 푎′ ≻푧′ 푎ˆ. In order
to establish that 휎푧 = 휎푧′ , all we need to do is ﬁnd 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ such that 푝 and 푞 are
symmetric with respect to 푧, 푧′, for once we do that, the result follows immediately
from the axiom of symmetry. We now proceed to establish that there exists such 푝
and 푞.
We will now show that there exists 푎˜ ∈ 퐴 such that the pair 푎ˆ, 푎˜ is equal gains
with respect to ≽푧 and ≽푧′ . Consider 푝′, 푞′ ∈ Δ, where
푝′ = ([푧, 1
2
; 푧′, 1
2
], 푎) and 푞′ = ([푧, 1
2
; 푧′, 1
2
], 푎′).
In case 푝′ ∼ 푞′, pick any 푎˜ ∈ [푎]푧 ∩ [푎′]푧′ . Then, the pair 푎ˆ, 푎˜ is equal gains with
respect to ≽푧 and ≽푧′ . On the other hand suppose 푝′ ≁ 푞′, and without loss of
generality, suppose 푝′ ≻ 푞′. Then we have that 푝′ ≻ 푞′ ≻ ([푧, 1
2
; 푧′, 1
2
], 푎ˆ) ≡ 푝′′, where
the ﬁnal strict preference follows from comparable monotonicity. It then follows from
bi-continuity that there exists some 휆 ∈ (0, 1), such that
휆푝′ ⊕ (1 - 휆)푝′′ = ([푧, 1
2
; 푧′, 1
2
], 풞ℰ푧([푎, 휆; 푎ˆ, (1− 휆)]) ∼ 푞′.
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Let 푎′′ = 풞ℰ푧([푎, 휆; 푎ˆ, (1− 휆)]). Now pick any 푎˜ ∈ [푎′′]푧 ∩ [푎′]푧′ . It follows that 푎ˆ, 푎˜ is
equal gains with respect to ≽푧 and ≽푧′ . Now deﬁne 푝, 푞 as follows:
푝 = [(푧, 푎ˆ), 1
2
; (푧′, 푎˜), 1
2
] and 푞 = [(푧, 푎˜), 1
2
; (푧′, 푎ˆ), 1
2
].
Clearly, 푝 and 푞 are symmetric with respect to 푧 and 푧′.
On the other hand if
{푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧 푎ˆ} = {푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧′ 푎ˆ}
for all 푎ˆ ∈ 퐴, then by the contingent values assumption, there exists ≽푧′′ , with ≻푧′′
∕= ∅ for which there exists 푎ˆ ∈ 퐴 such that
{푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧 푎ˆ} ∕= {푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧′′ 푎ˆ}
and,
{푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧′ 푎ˆ} ∕= {푎 ∈ 퐴 : 푎 ∼푧′′ 푎ˆ}.
Based on the argument in the last paragraph, we can then conclude that 휎푧 = 휎푧′′ ,
and 휎푧′ = 휎푧′′ , and hence 휎푧 = 휎푧′ .
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Chapter 3
Extending the Basic
Representations
3.1 Non-linear Other-regarding Preferences
So far in the analysis we have assumed that the preference relations≽푧, 푧 ∈ 푍, satisﬁes
the independence condition of expected utility theory. This condition implies that the
decision maker’s preferences over the risk faced by others, when she is guaranteed some
outcome 푧, is linear in probabilities. Here we want to allow for the possibility that
these preferences may be non-linear in probabilities. Our motivation behind doing this
exercise comes from existing models of decision making under risk (for example, rank
dependent utility and generalized prospect theory) that emphasize the distinction
that decision makers may make between raw probabilities and subjective decision
weights. For instance, in this literature it has been highlighted that a decision maker
may overweight small chances of receiving a ‘good outcome,’ and underweight large
chances. Such subjective probability weighting has been used to explain phenomena
such as the Allais paradox. We think that subjective weighting of probabilities may
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play a role when a decision maker with other-regarding preferences evaluates the risk
faced by others. For instance, it may well be the case that an altruistic decision maker
may overweight a small chance that someone she cares about has of getting a good
outcome.
In the representation that we provide here, DM evaluates a lottery 푝 ∈ Δ by the
function:
푊 (푝) =
∑
푧∈푍푝푍(푧){(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푝퐴,푧) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)}
where 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1], 푧 ∈ 푍, is a measure of DM’s concern for procedures.
We now make precise the exact structure that we will impose on ≽푧. For that,
we will adapt to our environment of risk a deﬁnition that Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2001) have provided in the context of uncertainty.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A preference relation ≽푧, with ≻푧 ∕= ∅, is biseparable if it satisﬁes
stochastic dominance,1 and admits a representation 푉푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ (that is unique up
to positive aﬃne transformation), for which there exists a strictly increasing bijection
휑푧: [0, 1] → [0, 1] that satisﬁes 휑푧(0) = 0, 휑푧(1) = 1, such that, if we let 푣푧(푎) =
푉푧(푎) for all 푎 ∈ 퐴, then for all 푎′, 푎′′ ∈ 퐴, 푎′ ≽푧 푎′′, and all 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
푉푧([푎
′, 휆; 푎′′, 1− 휆]) = 휑푧(휆)푣푧(푎′) + (1− 휑푧(휆))푣푧(푎′′).
As the name suggests, biseparable preferences introduce event-separability in a
very limited sense; viz. lotteries that put positive probability on only two outcomes
(for the others) are evaluated by the decision maker in the spirit of generalized ex-
pected utility. Other than that the only restriction on ≽푧 is that it respects stochastic
1We say that a lottery 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates a lottery 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 with
respect to ≽푧, if for all 푎 ∈ 퐴, the probability that 푝퐴 assigns to outcomes that are at least as
good as 푎 (according to ≽푧) is at least as large as the corresponding probability under 푞퐴, and is
strictly larger for some 푎 ∈ 퐴. ≽푧 satisﬁes stochastic dominance if whenever 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴 ﬁrst order
stochastically dominates 푞퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, we have 푝퐴 ≻푧 푞퐴.
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dominance. The function 휑푧 is referred to as a probability weighting function. The
probability weighting function has the interpretation that it transforms ‘raw’ or objec-
tive probabilities into decision weights that capture the attitude that DM has toward
the chance or risk faced by others.
AXIOM: Biseparability
≽푧 is biseparable for all 푧 ∈ 푍 with ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
In the subsequent analysis, we shall not distinguish between the functions 푉푧 and
푣푧, and use the latter to denote both. Further, we will call 푣푧 a biseparable repre-
sentation of the biseparable preference ≽푧. Some prominent examples of biseparable
preferences include expected utility, rank dependent utility, and Gul’s ‘disappoint-
ment averse’ preferences.
Ghirardato et al. (2003) have shown that the structure of biseparable preferences
can be used to deﬁne ‘subjective mixtures’ or ‘preference averages.’ That is, for any
two outcomes 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴, we can identify an outcome 푎 ∈ 퐴 that can be considered
as the ‘mid-point’ on DM’s ‘preference scale’ between 푎 and 푎′. Given that the
biseparable representation 푣푧 of ≽푧 is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation,
such an 푎 is characterized by the equation,
푣푧(푎) =
1
2
푣푧(푎) +
1
2
푣푧(푎
′).
Ghirardato et al. (2003) have shown, in the context of uncertainty, that the notion
of a preference average can be equivalently deﬁned from behavioral primitives. We
now provide a similar deﬁnition in our setting of risk. In the way of notation, note
that, for any 푝퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, 풞ℰ푧(푝퐴) ∈ 퐴 shall denote the certainty equivalent of 푝퐴 with
respect to the preference relation ≽푧; that is, 풞ℰ푧(푝퐴) ∼푧 푝퐴.
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Deﬁnition 3.2. For any 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴, if 푎 ≽푧 푎′, we say that 푎 ∈ 퐴 is a preference
average of 푎 and 푎′ with respect to ≽푧, denoted 12푎 ⊕푧 12푎′, if for all 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
[푎, 휆; 푎′, 1− 휆] ∼푧 [풞ℰ푧([푎, 휆; 푎, 1− 휆]), 휆; 풞ℰ푧([푎, 휆; 푎′, 1− 휆]), 1− 휆].
If 푎′ ≽푧 푎, 푎 is said to be a preference average of 푎 and 푎′ if it is a preference average
of 푎′ and 푎.
For a discussion of why the criterion above constitutes a meaningful deﬁnition
of preference average, the reader is encouraged to refer to the lucid commentary in
Ghirardato et al. (2003). A couple of comments are in order. The ﬁrst is that
the preference average of any 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴 need not be unique; there may be multiple
elements in 퐴 that are a preference average of such 푎 and 푎′. All such preference
averages form an indiﬀerence class of ≽푧 (see Lemma 3.1 below), and by 12푎 ⊕푧 12푎′
we shall denote a representative of this indiﬀerence class. Second, since ≽푧 satisﬁes
stochastic dominance, if 푎 is a preference average of 푎 and 푎′, then 푎 ≽푧 푎 ≽푧 푎′, and
this holds with strict preference if 푎 ≻푧 푎′. The next Lemma ties down the behavioral
and utility approaches of deﬁning preference averages by showing that for biseparable
preferences they coincide. (The proof of the Lemma mimics the proof of Proposition
1 in Ghirardato et al. (2003), and the details are omitted.)
Lemma 3.1. Let 푣푧 be a biseparable representation of (the biseparable preference)
≽푧. For any 푎, 푎′ ∈ 퐴, 푎 ∈ 퐴 is a preference average of 푎 and 푎′ with respect to ≽푧
if and only if
푣푧(푎) =
1
2
푣푧(푎) +
1
2
푣푧(푎
′).
Further, preference averages of 푎 and 푎′ exist for any 푎, 푎′ in 퐴, and they form an
indiﬀerence class. That is, if 푎 and 푎ˆ are both preference averages of 푎 and 푎′, then
푎 ∼푧 푎ˆ.
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Note that we can now easily deﬁne iterated averages like 1
2
푎 ⊕푧 [12푎 ⊕푧 12푎′], which
is equivalent to a 3
4
: 1
4
mixture of 푎 and 푎′, and denoted 3
4
푎 ⊕푧 14푎′. More generally,
continuity makes it possible to identify from behavior a 휆 : 1 − 휆 mixture of 푎 and
푎′ for any 휆 ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, we can extend the notion of subjective mixtures to
the whole of Δ퐴. For any 푝퐴, 푝
′
퐴 ∈ Δ퐴, if 푝퐴 ≽푧 푝′퐴, we say that 푝퐴 is a 휆 : 1 − 휆
mixture of 푝퐴 and 푝
′
퐴 with respect to ≽푧, denoted 휆푝퐴⊕푧(1− 휆)푝′퐴, if
풞ℰ푧(푝퐴) = 휆풞ℰ푧(푝퐴)⊕푧 (1− 휆)풞ℰ푧(푝′퐴).
We now deﬁne an appropriate notion of subjective mixtures and mixture compara-
bility for the current setting.
Deﬁnition 3.3. Given 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ that are comparable at some 푧 ∈ 푍, we denote by
휆푝 ⊕ (1−휆)푞 an element in Δ that is comparable with 푝 (and hence with 푞) at 푧 and
satisﬁes,
푎(푧, 휆푝⊕(1− 휆)푞) ∼푧 휆푎(푧, 푝)⊕푧(1− 휆)푎(푧, 푞) and (휆푝⊕(1− 휆)푞)퐴 ∼푧
휆푝퐴⊕푧(1− 휆)푞퐴.
Further, if 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ are such that 푝 = (푝푍 , 푎), 푞 = (푞푍 , 푎), for some 푎 ∈ 퐴, then we
deﬁne
휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞 = 휆푝 + (1− 휆)푞
Finally, if 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ are such that 푝 = (푧, 푝퐴), 푞 = (푧, 푞퐴), for some 푧 ∈ 푍, then we
deﬁne
휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞 = (푧, 휆푝퐴 ⊕푧 (1− 휆)푞퐴)
We will say that 푝 and 푞 ∈ Δ are mixture comparable if 휆푝 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞 exists for
all 휆 ∈ [0, 1].
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Comparable independence now applies with respect to lotteries that are mixture
comparable as per the above deﬁnition.
AXIOM: Comparable Independence∗
Let 푝1, 푝2, 푞1, 푞2 in Δ be such that 푝1, 푝2 are mixture comparable, as are 푞1, 푞2. Then,
for all 휆 ∈ (0, 1],
[푝1 ≻ 푞1, 푝2 ∼ 푞2] ⇒ 휆푝1 ⊕ (1− 휆)푝2 ≻ 휆푞1 ⊕ (1− 휆)푞2.
In addition, the notion of a procedure-adjusted equivalent also needs to be appro-
priately deﬁned. To do that we introduce the following piece of notation. For any 푝
in Δ we will refer to the set
{(푧, 푝퐴,푧, 푝퐴) : 푧 is in the support of 푝푍}
as the collection of risk proﬁles under 푝, and for any particular 푧 in the support of
푝푍 , we will refer to (푧, 푝퐴,푧, 푝퐴) as the risk proﬁle at 푧 under 푝.
Deﬁnition 3.4. Let 푝 ∈ Δ be such that for each risk proﬁle (푧, 푝퐴,푧, 푝퐴), 푧 in the
support of 푝푍, there exists a procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎˜, 푝˜퐴), with 푝퐴,푧 ∼푧 푎˜
and 푝퐴 ∼푧 푝˜퐴, that is revealed indiﬀerent to a procedure-contingent outcome (푧, 푎ˆ푧, 푎ˆ푧),
for some 푎ˆ푧 ∈ 퐴. Then we call the lottery,
휋(푝) = [< (푧, 푎ˆ푧), 푝푍(푧) >푧∈푆[푝푍 ]] ∈ Δ, where 푆[푝푍 ] denotes the support of 푝푍,
the procedure-adjusted equivalent of 푝.
The dominance axiom can then be stated in terms of the above deﬁnition of
procedure-adjusted equivalents.
AXIOM: Dominance∗
Let 푝, 푞 ∈ Δ and 휋(푝), 휋(푞) ∈ Δ be procedure-adjusted equivalents of 푝 and 푞 respec-
tively. If 휋(푝) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates 휋(푞) with respect to ≽, then 푝 ≻
푞.
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Theorem 3.1. Suppose contingent values hold. Then ≽ on Δ satisﬁes the axioms
of weak order, bounded bi-continuity, revealed consistency, comparable monotonicity,
biseparability, comparable independence∗ and dominance∗ if and only if there exists
∙ a function 푤 : 푍 × Δ퐴 → ℝ, such that 푤(푧, .) : Δ퐴 → 푅 is a biseparable
representation of ≽푧, and
∙ constants 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1], 푧 ∈ 푍,
such that the function 푊 : Δ → ℝ, given by
푊 (푝) =
∑
푧∈푍푝푍(푧){(1− 휎푧)푤(푧, 푝퐴,푧) + 휎푧푤(푧, 푝퐴)}
represents ≽.
In addition, another pair (푤˜ , (휎˜푧)푧∈푍) represents ≽ in the above sense if and only if
there exists constants 훼 > 0 and 훽 such that 푤˜ = 훼푤 + 훽, and 휎˜푧 = 휎푧 for all 푧 ∈
푍 with ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
Once again, if we impose the axiom of symmetry, then we can establish that 휎푧
= 휎 for all 푧 ∈ 푍 and that this 휎 is unique as long as there exists ≽푧 with ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
The proof of the theorem is available in the Appendix.
3.2 Tastes and Values
In the representations presented so far, the utility that DM receives from a pair like
(푧, 푎) ∈ 푍 ×퐴 is non-separable across what she receives and what the others receive.
We introduce here a representation in which there is separability across these terms.
Our primary motivation for doing this exercise is to make our representation more
amenable to applications. Under the representation that we will present here, DM
evaluates a lottery 푝 ∈ Δ by the function:
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푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎)[푢(푧) + (1− 휎푧)푣푧(푎) + 휎푧푣푧(푝퐴)],
where 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1]. We think of the function 푢, which provides DM’s subjective ranking
of the outcomes that she may get (independent of any consideration of what the others
get) as reﬂecting DM’s tastes. On the other hand, the family of functions 푣푧 reﬂects
DM’s values or morals.2
In order to achieve the desired separability, we will have to expand the domain
of preferences. We assume that DM’s preferences are given by a preference relation
(weak order) ≽ on the set,
Δ+ = Δ ∪ Δ푍 .
We will provide here an axiomatization that implies that ≽푧 is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern preference. An alternative axiomatization where ≽푧 is biseparable can
be provided along similar lines.
AXIOM: Weak Order∗∗
≽ on Δ+ is complete and transitive.
The boundedness condition needs to be appropriately modiﬁed to account for the
expanded domain.
AXIOM: Bounded Bi-Continuity∗∗
Bi-continuity: For any 휆 ∈ [0, 1] and 푞 ∈ Δ, the sets
{((푧′, 푎′), (푧′′, 푎′′)) : [(푧′, 푎′), 휆; (푧′′, 푎′′), 1− 휆] ≽ 푞},
and,
2The distinction between tastes and values is motivated by the following quote from Kenneth
Arrow in ‘Social Choice and Individual Values’: “In general, there will then be a diﬀerence between
the ordering of social states according to the direct consumption of the individual and the ordering
when the individual adds his general standards of equity. We may refer to the former ordering as
reﬂecting the tastes of the individual and the latter as reﬂecting his values. The distinction between
the two is by no means clear cut...no sharp line can be drawn between tastes and values.”
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{((푧′, 푎′), (푧′′, 푎′′)) : 푞 ≽ [(푧′, 푎′), 휆; (푧′′, 푎′′), 1− 휆]}
are closed in [푍 × 퐴] × [푍 × 퐴].
Boundedness: There exists 푎∗ ∈ 퐴, such that for all 푙 ∈ Δ+ there exists 푧, 푧 ∈ 푍
satisfying (푧, 푎∗) ≽ 푙 ≽ (푧, 푎∗).
We now extend the notion of a procedure-adjusted equivalent for the current set-
up.
Deﬁnition 3.5. Let 푝 ∈ Δ be such that for each (푧푘, 푎푘) in the support of 푝, 푘 =
1, . . . ,퐾, the procedure-contingent outcome (푧푘,푎푘,푝퐴) is revealed indiﬀerent to a
procedure-contingent outcome (푧푘,푎˜푘, 푎˜푘) for some 푎˜푘 ∈ 퐴. Then we call the lottery,
휋(푝) = [(푧1, 푎˜1), 푝(푧1, 푎1); . . . ,(푧퐾 , 푎˜퐾), 푝(푧퐾 , 푎퐾)] ∈ Δ
the procedure-adjusted equivalent of 푝.
Further, for 푝푍 ∈ Δ푍, the procedure-adjusted equivalent 휋(푝푍) is given by 푝푍 itself.
The notion of a procedure-adjusted equivalent remains the same (as in the baseline
model) for lotteries in Δ. On the other hand, for lotteries in Δ푍 , since they specify
only outcomes for DM, the question of procedure does not arise. Accordingly, for such
a lottery 푝푍 , it is its own procedure-adjusted equivalent. The axiom of dominance
says the following.
AXIOM: Dominance∗∗
Let 푙, 푙′ ∈ Δ+ and 휋(푙), 휋(푙′) ∈ Δ+ be procedure-adjusted equivalents of 푙 and 푙′
respectively. If 휋(푙) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates 휋(푙′) with respect to ≽, then 푙
≻ 푙′.
We can now state our representation result, which separates tastes from values.
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Theorem 3.2. Suppose contingent values hold. Then ≽ on Δ+ satisﬁes the axioms of
weak order∗∗, bounded bi-continuity∗∗, revealed consistency, comparable monotonicity,
comparable independence and dominance∗∗ if and only if there exists a function 푢 : 푍
→ ℝ, functions 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ, 푧 ∈ 푍, that satisfy
푣푧(휆푝퐴 + (1− 휆)푝′퐴) = 휆푣푧(푝퐴) + (1− 휆)푣푧(푝′퐴), for all 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
and constants 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1], 푧 ∈ 푍, such that the function 푊 : Δ+ → ℝ deﬁned by
∙ 푊 (푝) = ∑(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎)[푢(푧) + (1− 휎푧)푣푧(푎) + 휎푧푣푧(푝퐴)], ∀ 푝 ∈ Δ, and
∙ 푊 (푝푍) =
∑
푧∈푍 푝푍(푧)푢(푧), ∀ 푝푍 ∈ Δ푍.
represents ≽.
In addition, any triple (푢˜, (푣˜푧)푧∈푍, (휎˜푧)푧∈푍) represents ≽ in the above sense if and
only if there exists constants 훼 > 0 and 훽 such that 푢˜ = 훼푢 + 훽, 푣˜푧 = 훼푣푧, for all 푧
∈ 푍, and 휎˜푧 = 휎푧 for all 푧 ∈ 푍 with ≻푧 ∕= ∅.
Once again if we impose the axiom of symmetry, then we can establish that 휎푧 =
휎 for all 푧 ∈ 푍, as long as there exists ≽푧 with ≻푧 ∕= ∅. Further, instead of assuming
that ≽푧 are vNM preferences, we could have assumed that they are biseparable. In
this case, we have a representation under which the utility of a lottery 푝 ∈ Δ is given
by
푊 (푝) =
∑
푧∈푍푝푍(푧)[푢(푧) + (1− 휎푧)푣푧(푝퐴,푧) + 휎푧푣푧(푝퐴)]
where 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1], and 푣푧 is a biseparable representation of ≽푧.
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3.3 Appendix
3.3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof of Theorem 3.1 proceeds along similar lines as the proof of Theorem 2.1.
We do not repeat the arguments here. The parts that need elaboration are brieﬂy
discussed below.
We need to deﬁne the appropriate family of mixture set structures on Δ퐴/∼푧 and
[Δ퐴/∼푧]2. We deﬁne these here. Consider any ≽푧. For any [푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧 ∈ Δ퐴/∼푧,
and 휆 ∈ [0, 1], deﬁne
휆[푝퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푞퐴]푧 = [휆푝퐴 ⊕푧 (1− 휆)푞퐴]푧
Similarly, for any ([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧), ([푝
′
퐴]푧, [푞
′
퐴]푧) ∈ [Δ퐴/∼푧]2, and 휆 ∈ [0, 1], deﬁne
휆([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) = (휆[푝퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)[푝′퐴]푧, 휆[푞퐴]푧 ⊕ˆ푧
(1− 휆)[푞′퐴]푧)
That is,
휆([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) ⊕ˆ푧 (1− 휆)([푝′퐴]푧, [푞′퐴]푧) = ([휆푝퐴 ⊕푧 (1− 휆)푝′퐴]푧, [휆푞퐴 ⊕푧 (1− 휆)푞′퐴]푧)
With the mixture set structure deﬁned, we can prove a corresponding version of
Lemma 2.2 stated with respect to this mixture set structure. Observe that a vNM
preference satisﬁes stochastic dominance and is biseparable. We essentially used
these two properties in the proof of Lemma 2.2. In particular, whenever we have a
biseparable preference relation ≽푧′ , if 푎ˆ, 푎˜, 푎ˆ′, 푎˜′ ∈ 퐴 are such that 푎ˆ ∼푧′ 푎˜ and 푎ˆ′ ∼푧′
푎˜′, then it follows that for any 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
[푎ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ′, 1− 휆] ∼푧′ [푎˜, 휆, 푎˜′, 1− 휆]
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It is this property that we used in Lemma 2.2 to establish that ≽ˆ푧 is ‘locally’ a
weak order on the appropriately deﬁned cubes. Once we establish the appropriate
properties (namely the ﬁve Anscombe-Aumann axioms) of ≽ˆ푧 locally, we can establish
the corresponding version of Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 3.2. (≽ˆ푧)Ω∗ is a weak order. Further, there exists
(i) a function 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ that represents ≽푧 and satisﬁes: for all 휆 ∈ [0, 1], 푝퐴, 푞퐴
∈ Δ퐴,
푣푧(휆푝퐴 ⊕푧 (1 − 휆)푞퐴) = 휆푣푧(푝퐴) + (1 − 휆)푣푧(푞퐴), and
(ii) a constant 휎푧 ∈ [0, 1],
such that the function 푉푧 : Ω
∗ → ℝ given by
푉푧([푝퐴]푧, [푞퐴]푧) = (1− 휎푧)푣푧(푝퐴) + 휎푧푣푧(푞퐴)
represents (≽ˆ푧)Ω∗. Further, another pair (푣˜푧, 휎˜푧) represents (≽ˆ푧)Ω∗ in the above sense
iﬀ 푣˜푧 is a positive aﬃne transformation of 푣푧 and 휎˜푧 = 휎푧, for all 푧 ∈ 푍 such that
≻푧 ∕= ∅.
Lemma 3.2 helps to establish that every 푝 ∈ Δ has a procedure-adjusted equiva-
lent. Further, dominance implies the following result.
Lemma 3.3. Let 푝 ∈ Δ, and let,
휋(푝) = [(푧1, 푎ˆ1), 푝푍(푧
1), . . . , (푧퐾 , 푎ˆ퐾), 푝푍(푧
퐾)] ∈ Δ
be the procedure-adjusted equivalent of 푝. Then
푝 ∼ [(푧∗(푧1, 푎ˆ1), 푎∗), 푝푍(푧1), . . . , (푧∗(푧퐾 , 푎ˆ퐾), 푎∗), 푝푍(푧퐾)],
where (푧∗(푧푘, 푎ˆ푘), 푎∗) ∈ 푍 ×퐴 are such that (푧∗(푧푘, 푎ˆ푘), 푎∗) ∼ (푧푘, 푎ˆ푘), for 푘 = 1, . .
. , 퐾.
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Finally, Lemma 2.8 will be replaced by the following:
Lemma 3.4. Let (푧, 푝퐴), (푧, 푞퐴) ∈ Δ. Then, for any 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
휆(푧, 푝퐴)⊕ (1− 휆)(푧, 푞퐴) ∼ 휆(푧∗(푧, 푝퐴), 푎∗) + (1− 휆)(푧∗(푧, 푞퐴), 푎∗),
where (푧∗(푧, 푝퐴), 푎∗), (푧∗(푧, 푞퐴), 푎∗) ∈ 푍 × 퐴 are such that
(푧∗(푧, 푝퐴), 푎∗) ∼ (푧, 푝퐴) and (푧∗(푧, 푞퐴), 푎∗) ∼ (푧, 푞퐴).
The rest of the proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2.1.
3.3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Once again the details of the proof are similar to that of the proof of Theorem 2.1,
and we do not repeat the arguments here. The parts that require elaboration are
discussed below.
Observe that replicating the steps of the proof of Theorem 2.1, gives us a pair (푤,
(휎푧)푧∈푍) that represents ≽ restricted to Δ. Next note that, the boundedness implies
that for any 푝푍 ∈ Δ푍 , there exists 푧∗(푝푍) ∈ 푍 such that 푝푍 ∼ (푧∗(푝푍), 푎∗). Then we
can deﬁne the extension of the function 푊 to Δ푍 by deﬁning 푊 (푝푍) = 푊 (푧
∗(푝푍), 푎∗).
Further deﬁne the function 푢 : 푍 → ℝ as 푢(푧) = 푊 (푧), where 푊 (푧) denotes the value
of the function 푊 for the degenerate lottery in Δ푍 that gives 푧 with probability 1.
Dominance then implies that
푊 (푝푍) =
∑
푧∈푍 푝푍(푧)푢(푧), ∀ 푝푍 ∈ Δ푍
Finally, deﬁne 푣푧 : Δ퐴 → ℝ to be 푣푧(푞퐴) = 푊 (푧, 푞퐴) − 푢(푧). It then follows that
푊 (푝) =
∑
(푧,푎)∈푍×퐴푝(푧, 푎)[푢(푧) + (1− 휎푧)푣푧(푎) + 휎푧푣푧(푝퐴)], ∀ 푝 ∈ Δ.
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Chapter 4
Modeling Non-consequentialist
Voting Behavior
In this chapter, we use our decision model to provide some foundations for non-
consequentialist voting behavior. It has long been recognized that an individual’s
decision of whether or not to vote, and what alternative to vote for, if she indeed
does vote, may be inﬂuenced by considerations other than how her choice impacts
electoral outcomes. She may consider such choices to be intrinsically valuable. This
has motivated expressive theories of voting which seek to incorporate a consumption
or intrinsic value of voting. In much of the literature, this consumption value of
voting is taken as an exogenous feature of the model and therefore independent of
what outcomes are. What is the source of this consumption value of voting and
is it reasonable to take this value to be independent of outcomes? For instance,
consider a rigged election. Would voters, who otherwise derive a consumption value
of voting, still derive these payoﬀs in such an election? It may well be that they
do not. Therefore, it is a useful exercise to “endogenize” the consumption value of
voting. The decision model that we have developed in the earlier chapters allow us
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to do this.
Our motivation behind providing this expressive theory of voting is two-fold. The
ﬁrst goal is choice theoretic. When viewed from the perspective of a consequentialist
paradigm, voting behavior of non-consequentialist voters may appear to be paradox-
ical and indeed against self-interest. The voting model we introduce here allows us
to rationalize voting behavior which when viewed from a consequentialist view point
may appear to be against one’s self-interest. Second, we address the question of what
impact the presence of such non-consequentialist voters may have on electoral out-
comes. To help us address these issues, we begin by considering some experimental
evidence from a recent paper by Feddersen, Gailmard and Sandroni (2009).
The basic hypothesis that their work proposes is that large elections may exhibit
a moral bias, namely, alternatives understood by voters to be morally superior are
more likely to win in large elections than in small ones. To make this point, they
conduct an experimental election with two alternatives – call these the moral option
and the selﬁsh option. The basic details of their experiment are as follows. First,
subjects were divided into two groups, one consisting of voters and the other of non-
voters. Then the voters cast their votes. Finally, after all voters had cast their vote,
one voter was randomly picked, and the choice she reported became the outcome of
the election. Observe that under this particular method of determining the outcome
of the election, the probability that any given voter’s vote is pivotal, i.e., that her
vote determines the outcome of the election, is given by the reciprocal of the number
of voters. The experimenters varied the number of eligible voters across diﬀerent
trials of the experiment and, by so doing, the probability of a voter being pivotal was
directly controlled as a treatment variable in the experiment. As far as payoﬀs went,
the selﬁsh option gave a higher monetary reward to the voters than the moral option.
On the other hand, the moral option was better for the non-voters than the selﬁsh
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option. An interesting pattern of choice exhibited by a non-trivial number of voters is
the following. When the probability of their vote being pivotal was high, in particular
when it was 1 (i.e., they were dictatorial), these voters chose the selﬁsh option. On
the other hand, when the pivot probability was low, their vote switched to the moral
option. Overall, the data from across diﬀerent trials of the experiment showed a
strong (statistically signiﬁcant) positive relationship between the probability of the
moral option being the electoral outcome and the size of the electorate.
One may make the case that the voters mentioned above voted against their self-
interest based on the following kind of argument. When these voters were dictatorial,
they chose the selﬁsh option. This choice reveals that they prefer the selﬁsh option
to the moral one. At the same time, in elections where the probability that their
vote is pivotal was low, they ended up voting for the moral option which, if one
were to go by their revealed preference inferred from the ﬁrst choice, is their less
preferred alternative. It is important to recognize though that such an argument is
based on consequentialism. That is, it assumes that voters have a ranking over the
electoral outcomes independent of the process by which these outcomes are generated.
Such a consequentialist argument is not appropriate for voters whose behavior is
inﬂuenced by non-consequentialist considerations. For instance, such voters may
derive ‘utility’ from the very act of voting for a particular choice owing to motivations
like a sense of civic obligation or a desire to act ‘morally’ by making certain choices.
Such individuals may be said to derive an expressive value from voting. We will now
use our decision model to sketch out such an expressive theory of voting. We will
show how concerns for procedure can rationalize voting behavior which, when viewed
from a consequentialist standpoint, appear to be against one’s self-interest. Further,
we will show that the presence of such non-consequentialist voters is qualitatively
signiﬁcant in terms of electoral outcomes.
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4.1 A Simple Model
We consider an election with two alternatives, 1 and 2, in a society consisting of 푛
voters. We think of each of the alternatives as determining an outcome for each of the
individuals in society. Accordingly, the alternatives can be thought of as determining
the allocation for this society. We treat 푛 as a parameter of the model. In this simple
model, we assume that there are no costs to voting. This will ensure that everyone
votes in the election. Further, the result of the election will be determined by the
following mechanism, which mimics the one used by Feddersen et al. First, all voters
cast their votes. After all voters have reported their choice, one voter is drawn at
random, and the choice she reported determines the outcome of the election.
We make the assumption that all voters are identical in terms of their preferences.
This simpliﬁes the analysis, since it allows us to conduct it in the context of a ‘repre-
sentative voter.’ Let us now describe what the problem looks like when viewed from
the perspective of one such representative voter (RV). As mentioned above, she can
vote for either alternative 1 or alternative 2. If alternative 1 is the group choice, the
resulting allocation is (푧1, 푎1) ∈ 푍 × 퐴,1 where 푧1 refers to the outcome for RV, and
푎1 refers to the vector of outcomes for everyone else. Similarly, if alternative 2 is the
group choice, the resulting allocation is (푧2, 푎2) ∈ 푍 × 퐴, where again 푧2 refers to
the outcome for RV, and 푎2 the outcomes for everyone else.
Note that under the electoral mechanism, the probability that RV is pivotal is
given by 훼 = 1/푛. Further, let 훽 denote the probability that alternative 1 is the
outcome of the election when RV is not pivotal.2 Then the probability distribution
1We continue using the notation that the set 푍 denotes the outcomes of the decision maker (who
in this case is the representative voter under consideration), 퐴푖, 푖 ∕= 푅푉 , denotes the set of outcomes
of individual 푖, and 퐴 =
∏
푖∕=푅푉 퐴푖.
2Of course, 훽 is an ‘endogenous object’
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over ﬁnal allocations generated by RV choosing alternative 1 is given by:
푝1 = [(푧1, 푎1), 훼 + (1− 훼)훽; (푧2, 푎2), 1− 훼− (1− 훼)훽],
and that by choosing alternative 2 is given by:
푝2 = [(푧1, 푎1), (1− 훼)훽; (푧2, 푎2), 1 − (1− 훼)훽]
Note that if RV’s preferences satisfy stochastic dominance, then her vote choice
is independent of pivot probabilities or, equivalently, of the number of voters. To
understand this claim, suppose, she prefers the allocation (푧2, 푎2) to (푧1, 푎1), that is,
she would choose alternative 2 if the choice were completely left to her. Now consider
any situation in which she is pivotal with probability 훼 = 1/푛. In this case, taking
the other voters’ choices as given (that is, taking 훽 as given), her vote for alternatives
1 and 2 generates respectively the lotteries 푝1 and 푝2 over ﬁnal allocations (listed
above). Since she prefers the allocation (푧2, 푎2) to (푧1, 푎1), stochastic dominance
requires that she must prefer the lottery 푝2 to the lottery 푝1, and hence must vote for
alternative 2 irrespective of what 훼 and 훽 are. Accordingly, assuming that RV has a
strict preference for one of the alternatives (in the above sense) we have:
Proposition 4.1. If voters’ preferences satisfy stochastic dominance, then there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium (in dominant strategies) that is independent of 푛 in which
either everyone votes for alternative 1 or everyone votes for alternative 2.
We now contrast this result with one that is implied by our decision model in
which decision makers may have procedural concerns. In this analysis, we will use
the ‘tastes and values’ model of Chapter 3 with the family of 푣푧 functions taking a
biseparable form. That is, any lottery 푝 is evaluated by the functional:
푊 (푝) =
∑
푧푝푍(푧)[푢(푧) + (1− 휎)푣푧(푝퐴,푧) + 휎푣푧(푝퐴)]
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where 휎 ∈ [0, 1], and 푣푧 is a biseparable representation of ≽푧. We will assume that
RV considers alternative 1 to be better on grounds of her values or morals. That is,
푣퐻 = 푣푧(푎
1) > 푣푧(푎
2) = 푣퐿, for 푧 = 푧
1, 푧2.
Further, we will assume that the preference relations ≽푧, 푧 = 푧1, 푧2, are cardinally
equivalent. This means that there exists a probability weighting function, that is, a
strictly increasing bijection 휑 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that satisﬁes 휑(0) = 0, 휑(1) = 1, such
that a lottery of the type [푎1, 휆; 푎2, 1 − 휆] is evaluated as,
푣푧([푎
1, 휆; 푎2, 1− 휆]) = 휑(휆)푣푧(푎1) + (1− 휑(휆))푣푧(푎2), for 푧 = 푧1, 푧2.
As discussed in Chapter 3 the probability weighting function has the interpretation
that it transforms objective probabilities into decision weights. These decision weights
capture the attitude that DM has toward the chance or risk faced by others. We will
further assume that the procedural weight 휎 is equal to 1
2
.
We deﬁne,
휈 = 푢퐻−푢퐿
푣퐻−푣퐿
and assume that:
∙ [푉 1] 휈 > 1.
∙ [푉 2] There exists 휆, 휆 ∈ (0, 1), such that for all 휆˜ ∈ (0,휆) ∪ (휆, 1), 휑 is diﬀer-
entiable, and 휑′(휆˜) > 2휈 − 1 . Further, 휑 is concave on the interval [0,휆).
[V1] can be rewritten as
푢퐻 + 푣퐿 > 푢퐿 + 푣퐻
The left-hand side gives RV’s payoﬀs under our representation from the allocation
(푧2, 푎2), whereas the right-hand side gives her payoﬀs from the allocation (푧1, 푎1).
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This condition therefore states that RV prefers the allocation (푧2, 푎2) to the allocation
(푧1, 푎1), when these allocations are considered by themselves (that is, each is viewed
as realizing with probability 1). Accordingly, if RV were a dictator who could decide
the election outcome on her own, she would choose alternative 2.
Assumptions [V1] and [V2] together imply that for all 휆˜ ∈ (0,휆) ∪ (휆, 1), 휑′(휆˜) >
1. It follows that there exists a neighborhood of 0 in which 휑(휆˜) > 휆˜, and there exists
a neighborhood of 1 in which 휑(휆˜) < 휆˜. in other words, the representative voter
tends to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities of her
morally preferred outcome for others, 푎1, being realized. This phenomenon of over-
weighting small probabilities, and under-weighting large ones, which is referred to as
regressive probability weighting, has been extensively documented in the literature on
decision making under risk, starting with the important contribution of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979).
Proposition 4.2. Under assumptions [V1] and [V2], there exists positive integers 푛
and 푛, 푛 < 푛, such that for all 푛 ≤ 푛, everyone voting for alternative 2 is the unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies), and for all 푛 ≥ 푛, everyone voting
for alternative 2 is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies).
The proof is available in the Appendix. Here, we brieﬂy go over the reasoning
that drives the result. Consider Figure 4.1, which has been constructed by taking
particular values of 푢퐻 , 푢퐿, 푣퐻 , 푣퐿 and functional form for the probability weighting
function that are consistent with assumptions [V1] and [V2]. The ﬁgure shows the
payoﬀ diﬀerence for our representative voter from voting for alternatives 1 and 2 as a
function of 훼, the pivot probability, and 훽, the probability that alternative 1 will be
chosen when RV is not pivotal. The shaded area represents those values of 훼 and 훽
for which the payoﬀ of voting for alternative 1 exceeds that of voting for alternative
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Figure 4.1: Payoﬀ diﬀerence between voting for alternatives 1 and 2.
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2. The incentives that RV has for voting for alternative 2 for high values of 훼 is quite
apparent given that she prefers alternative 2 to alternative 1. The interesting feature
of our model is that for low values of 훼, and for suitable values of 훽, her vote choice
shifts from alternative 2 to 1. In particular, there are two regions in the 훼-훽 box of
the ﬁgure in which the payoﬀ of voting for alternative 1 exceeds that of voting for
alternative 2. This vote switch is brought about by the role that procedures play in
her evaluation of prospects.
Consider ﬁrst the lower south-west region where both 훼 and 훽 are small. In this
scenario, RV knows that alternative 2 is the likely electoral outcome. Further, this
is true irrespective of which way she votes, since the probability 훼 that her vote is
pivotal is small. Thus, her vote is relatively insigniﬁcant in terms of determining
actual outcomes. But given that she cares about procedures, her vote holds a signiﬁ-
cance beyond its ability to inﬂuence the outcome of the election. Observe that since
alternative 1 is her morally preferred outcome, she can be made better oﬀ in the event
that alternative 2 is the electoral outcome if alternative 1 had a higher ex-ante chance
of being realized. So by voting for alternative 1 she can increase this ex-ante chance
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and receive higher payoﬀs with respect to her procedural concerns. What makes this
increase in ‘procedural payoﬀs’ signiﬁcant (relative to the increase in ‘outcome pay-
oﬀs’ if she votes for alternative 2) is the fact that she over-weights small chances of
her morally preferred outcome for others, 푎1, being realized. So to sum up, voting
for alternative 1 is almost identical to voting for alternative 2 via her concerns for
outcomes. On the other hand, voting for alternative 1 is comparatively much better
than voting for alternative 2 via her concerns for procedure. Accordingly, under this
scenario, she votes for alternative 1.
Now consider the north-west corner of the 훼-훽 box. In this scenario alternative 1 is
the likely electoral outcome, and given that 훼 is small, this is true irrespective of which
way RV votes. Therefore, voting for alternative 1 is almost identical, once again, to
voting for alternative 2 in terms of outcomes. On the other hand, voting for alternative
1 is relatively better than voting for alternative 2 via her concerns for procedure. To
see this, note that if she were to vote for alternative 2, it would reduce the ex-ante
chance of alternative 1 being realized by 훼. Given that the chance of alternative 1
being realized is close to 1, the regressive nature of probability weighting close to 1,
namely, that probabilities are under-weighted, makes this reduction in ex-ante chance
unattractive for her. Accordingly, under this scenario, she votes for alternative 1
Given the structure of payoﬀ diﬀerences, it should now be obvious why our result
follows. In particular, note that when everyone else is voting for alternative 1 (훽 =
1), for small pivot probabilities, RV’s best response is to vote for alternative 1.
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4.2 A Model with Costly Voting and Private In-
formation
In this section we will introduce two changes to the simple model of the last section.
First, we will consider the case in which the outcome of the election is determined
by plurality rule. That is the outcome of the election is determined by which ever
alternative receives the greater number of votes. In case of a tie, we will assume that
alternative 2 is the electoral outcome.
Second, we consider a situation in which individuals have a cost of voting. Given
positive costs of voting, it may now be that it is in an individual’s best interest to
abstain from voting. In other words, apart from deciding about which alternative
to vote for, an individual has to decide whether she wants to vote or abstain. We
will assume that the cost of voting is separable from her evaluation of a lottery. In
particular, if 푝 is a lottery over allocations that is engendered (ex-ante) by the proﬁle
of individual choices, her payoﬀs is given by
푊˜ (푝, 푐) = 푊 (푝) − 푐, if she votes
and,
푊˜ (푝, 푐) = 푊 (푝), if she abstains.
In other words, in terms of our representation, while considering allocations, the
decision maker only considers her own costs and ignores the cost incurred by others.
Further, she evaluates her “outcomes” and costs separably.
We will assume that an individual’s cost of voting is private information. In the
language of Bayesian games, an individual’s cost is then her type. We will assume
that the costs of voting for each individual is (independently) distributed according
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to the distribution function 퐹 , which has support [0, 푐] ⊆ ℝ, where 푐 > 0. We will
assume that the function 퐹 is common knowledge.
Formally, a strategy is a mapping:
푠 : [0, 푐] : → {Abstain, Vote for 1, Vote for 2}
We will restrict attention here to symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. That is Bayesian
equilibrium in which all individuals of the same cost type take the same decision.
All individuals choosing voting strategy 푠 is a Bayesian Equilibrium if and only if
for all cost types 푐 ∈ [0, 푐], the decision 푠(푐) is a best response given that all other
individuals play 푠. Further, we will call any such symmetric Bayesian equilibrium a
Values equilibrium if all cost types that vote, vote for alternative 1.
Proposition 4.3. There exists 푛, such that for all 푛 > 푛, there exists a unique Values
equilibrium.
4.3 Appendix
4.3.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Recall that the representative voter is pivotal with probability 훼 = 1
푛
, and 훽 denotes
the probability that alternative 1 is the outcome when she is not pivotal. Then the
probability distributions over ﬁnal allocations generated by the representative voter
choosing 1 and 2 are respectively,
푝1 = [(푧1, 푎1), 훼 + (1− 훼)훽; (푧2, 푎2), 1− 훼− (1− 훼)훽],
푝2 = [(푧1, 푎1), (1− 훼)훽; (푧2, 푎2), 1 − (1− 훼)훽]
Under out representation these two lotteries are evaluated as:
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푈(푝1) = 푢퐻 +
푣퐿
2
− (훼 + (1−훼)훽)[푢퐻 − 푢퐿 − 12(푣퐻 − 푣퐿)] + 12 [휑(훼 + (1−훼)훽)푣퐻
+ (1 − 휑(훼 + (1− 훼)훽))푣퐿]
and,
푈(푝2) = 푢퐻+
푣퐿
2
−(1−훼)훽[푢퐻−푢퐿−1
2
(푣퐻−푣퐿)]+1
2
[휑((1−훼)훽)푣퐻+(1−휑((1−훼)훽))푣퐿]
Subtracting the two gives,
푈(푝2)−푈(푝1) = 훼[푢퐻−푢퐿− 1
2
(푣퐻−푣퐿)]− 1
2
(푣퐻−푣퐿)[휑(훼+(1−훼)훽)−휑((1−훼)훽)]
Accordingly,
푈(푝2)− 푈(푝1) ≥ 0⇔ 푔(훼) = 훼(2휈 − 1)− (휑(훼 + (1− 훼)훽)− 휑((1− 훼)훽)) ≥ 0
Now suppose everyone other than RV votes for alternative 1; i.e., 훾 = 1. Then,
푔(훼) = 훼(2휈 − 1)− (1− 휑(1− 훼))
and, for 훼 ∈ (0, 1− 휆),
푔′(훼) = 2휈 − 1− 휑′(1− 훼)
Let 휆′ = min{1−휆, 휆}. Then for all 훼 ∈ (0, 휆′), 푔′(훼) < 0. Further, 푔(0) = 0. Hence,
푔(훼) < 0 for all 훼 ∈ (0, 휆′). Let 푛 be any integer greater than 1
휆′ . Then,for all 푛 > 푛,
everyone voting for alternative 1 is a Nash equilibrium.
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Now consider the case when everyone other than RV votes for alternative 2. That
is 훽 = 0. Then,
푔(훼) = 훼(2휈 − 1)− 휑(훼) = 훼[2휈 − 1− 휑(훼)
훼
]
Note that, for 훼 < 휆′, 휑′(훼) > 2휈 − 1, and since 휑 is concave over this range, 휑(훼)
훼
>
휑′(훼). Accordingly, for 훼 < 휆′, 푔(훼) < 0, and everyone voting for alternative 2 can
not be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, for all 푛 ≥ 푛, everyone voting for alternative 1 is
the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies).
Further, note that when 훽 = 0, 푔(1) = 2휈 > 0. By continuity of 푔, there exists
an interval (휆1, 1], such that for all 훼 ∈ (휆1, 1], 푔(훼) > 0, and accordingly everyone
voting for alternative 2 is a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, note that when 훽 = 1, 푔(1) = 2휈 − 2 > 0. Once again by the continuity
of 푔, there exists an interval (휆2, 1], such that for all 훼 ∈ (휆2, 1], 푔(훼) > 0, and
accordingly everyone voting for alternative 1 is not a Nash equilibrium. Let, 휆′′ =
max{휆1, 휆2}, and 푛 be any integer less than 1푛′′ . It follows that for all 푛 ≤ 푛, everyone
voting for alternative 2 is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies).
4.3.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
We will show below that the Values equilibrium strategies will be of a cutoﬀ type,
namely, all individuals who have cost below some level 푐 will vote for the alternative
1, while those above will abstain. Let us consider what any individual’s decision
problem looks like given that all the other individuals are following such a cutoﬀ
strategy, with cutoﬀ cost 푐 ∈ (0, 푐].
Let, 푝1, 푝퐴 denote the probability distribution over ﬁnal allocations if the decision
maker votes for alternative 1 and abstains respectively. In particular,
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푝1 = [(푧1, 푎1), 1],
푝퐴 = [(푧1, 푎1), 1− 훼; (푧2, 푎2), 1 − 훼],
where 훼 denotes the probability that all the other 푛−1 individuals have a cost above
푐; that is
훼(푐) = (1− 퐹 (푐))푛−1.
Note that, for any 푐 ∈ (0, 푐), 훼 converges monotonically to 0. So by Dini’s theorem it
follows that the sequence of functions (훼(.))푘∈ℕ+ converges uniformly to the constant
function 0.
Now let,
푔(훼) = 푊 (푝1) − 푊 (푝퐴)
Elementary calculations imply that
푔(훼) =
푣퐻 − 푣퐿
2
{1− 휑(1− 훼)− 훼(2휈 − 1)}.
It further follows that
푔′(훼) =
푣퐻 − 푣퐿
2
{휑′(1− 훼)− (2휈 − 1)}.
Under our assumptions for 훼 suﬃciently small, we have that 푔′(훼) > 0. Given that
푔 is continuous and 푔(0) = 0, it follows that for 훼 suﬃciently small, 푔(훼) > 0. Given
the uniform convergence of the sequence of functions (훼(.))푘∈ℕ+ , it follows that for 푛
large, 푊 (푝1) > 푊 (푝퐴).
A similar set of calculations can be used to establish that for 푛 suﬃciently large,
the payoﬀs of voting for alternative 1 exceeds that of alternative 2. We then have
that there exists some 푛∗ such that for all 푛 > 푛∗,
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1. Payoﬀs of voting for alternative 1 exceeds that of voting for alternative 2, and
2. 푊 (푝1) > 푊 (푝퐴).
Accordingly, the individual votes for alternative 1 if and only if
푊 (푝1) − 푊 (푝퐴) ≥ 푐′,
where 푐′ denotes the individual’s cost of voting. Deﬁne the function 퐺 : (0, 푐] by
퐺(푐) = 푔(훼(푐)).
Then it follows that the cutoﬀ strategy 푐 is a Values equilibrium if
퐺(푐) = 푐.
Note that 퐺(푐) is strictly decreasing. This along with the fact that 퐺(푐) = 0, allows
us to conclude that for all 푛 > 푛∗, there exists a unique Values equilibrium.
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